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ABSTRACT 
Courts in First Amendment cases long have invoked the truth-seeking value of 
speech, but they rarely probe its meaning or significance, and some ignore it 
altogether.  As new cases implicate questions of truth and falsity, thorough 
assessment of the value is needed.  This Article fills the gap by making three claims.  
First, interest in truth-seeking has resurfaced in journalism, politics, philosophy, 
and fiction, converging on a concept of provisional or “functional” truth.  Second, 
the appeal of functional truth for the law may be that it clarifies thinking about a 
range of human priorities—survival, progress, and character—without insisting on 
truth in an absolute or transcendent sense.  Third, the law’s current treatment of 
truth-seeking in First Amendment cases turns on whether a case implicates the 
truth of the past, present, or future.  Cases about past truth involve its knowability; 
cases about present truth involve its hiddenness; and cases about future truth 
involve its falsification.  Because judicial treatment of truth-seeking in each of 
these groupings is underdeveloped, legal thought can benefit from literary works 
by three major novelists:  Paul Scott, author of Staying On; Kazuo Ishiguro, author 
of Never Let Me Go; and Ian McEwan, author of Atonement.  Each of these works 
clarifies an important aspect of the truth-seeking value of expressive freedoms.  The 
Article concludes by considering the value’s limitations, focusing on the complex 
setting of campaign finance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the opening decades of the twenty-first century, an arresting but 
underappreciated development in First Amendment jurisprudence has been the 
resurfacing of the “truth-seeking” or enlightenment value of the freedoms of speech 
and press.1  This value underlies the familiar metaphor of “the marketplace of 
ideas,”2 in which at least two kinds of debates are thought to occur: the first, a clash 
over facts, specifically over which factual assertions relating to politics, culture, 
science, or other topics are worthy of belief; and the second, a clash over opinions, 
specifically over which evaluations of factual assertions are worthy of acceptance 
and on what basis.3  Exploring the layered truth-seeking value from several sides, 
this Article asks a number of questions.  Does the value have more than negligible 
rhetorical significance in First Amendment contexts?  What sorts of cases prompt 
judges to relate them to a “search for truth”?  What do courts find useful in a 
vocabulary that links speaking to searching, and searching to something that many 
take to be unsearchable?  The Article concludes that while the “search for truth” in 
the context of First Amendment decisions is related to versions of the concept of 
“functional truth” found in other contexts—journalism, political theory, 
philosophy, and works of fiction—its meaning in the law is necessarily its own.4  
 
 1. See Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV. 445, 
446 (2012) (noting increased scholarly attention to “the uneasy role of truth within First Amendment 
doctrine”). 
 2. “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail . . . .”  Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969).  See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–52 (1988) (recognizing the “truth-
seeking” function of the First Amendment and explaining that self-expression is “essential to the 
common quest for truth”). 
 3. In a perceptive essay on truth in political life, Jeremy Elkins notes that “a politics of truth 
need not depend on a claim to possess absolute knowledge of the world or universal laws, but follows 
simply and directly from the idea that beyond our opinions there lies a world.”  Jeremy Elkins, 
Concerning Practices of Truth, in TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 19, 27 (Jeremy Elkins & Andrew Norris 
eds., 2012).  Elkins observes that “claims of truth” refer to “one’s views about what is and about how 
things in [the world] are,” and that these views “can be subject to evaluations of veracity—not whether 
they correspond to the world in some naked, noumenal essence, but whether we have good enough 
reason for accepting them in light of everything we know as well as what we reasonably, under the 
circumstances, might come to know.”  Id.  “[W]hen those views become the basis for claims on the 
political community,” public debate can encompass not only the factual bases of the claims but also the 
strengths and weaknesses of the claims themselves.  Id. 
 4. See, e.g., BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 55–56 (3d ed. 
2014) (describing journalism as producing “functional truth,” defined as “a sorting-out process that takes 
place between the initial story and the interaction among the public, newsmakers, and journalists”); 
Joshua Cohen, Truth and Public Reason, in TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 3, at 218–20 
(advancing a nonmetaphysical “political conception of truth” that “can reasonably be endorsed as 
common ground for the purposes of consequential collective decisions”); JOHN D. CAPUTO, TRUTH: 
PHILOSOPHY IN TRANSIT 103–04 (2013) (positing a view of truth as “always a process,” marked by 
“open-endedness and availability to change,” including idea of “truth as an event, as something still to 
be made or done, as what lies ahead, as still in the making, and hence as a promise/risk”); James Wood, 
The Trick of Truth, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 21, 2002) (reviewing IAN MCEWAN, ATONEMENT (2001)) 
(discussing McEwan’s novel as “explicitly troubled by fiction’s fictionality—its artificiality—and eager 
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The distinctiveness of that meaning lies in its emphasis on “seeking” as an 
enterprise that is communicative and therefore shared in complex ways.  In this 
sense, the truth-seeking value of speech and press combines notions of both 
freedom and democratic respect.5  Its link to freedom contemplates a dynamic that 
generously protects a speaker’s ability to reach an audience or uncover information 
in the face of forces that would silence or chill.  But the value’s grounding in 
democratic respect is also central:  the dynamic is meant to be dialogic in nature 
and collective in benefit, even if the dialogue is not closely orchestrated and the 
benefits can be less than immediate.  The truth-seeking value prompts a persistent 
if uneven process of trial and error that, for better or worse, leaves most of the 
sifting and weighing to citizens themselves. 
To be sure, the value has figured prominently in leading cases of other eras.  
One need only recall the most celebrated moment in “free speech” history:  the 
unexpected self-reversal and invocation of truth-seeking by Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., a proud philosophic skeptic in almost every other context.  In 1919, 
Holmes voted to overturn the criminal convictions of socialist and anarchist 
dissidents who had distributed leaflets opposing deployment of U.S. troops to 
Russia during World War I.6  The leaflets declared capitalism “an enemy of the 
workers of the world,” and accused President Wilson of cowardice for not owning 
up to U.S. interference with the Russian Revolution.7  As Holmes put it, the 
radicals wanted “to change the mind of the country” by convincing Americans of 
the “truth” of U.S. dishonesty and greed.8  Influenced by young intellectuals who 
had hammered his earlier votes to sustain similar convictions under the Espionage 
Act,9 Holmes found a First Amendment violation in the convictions of the 
defendants in Abrams v. United States, whose leaflets he said amounted at best to 
“puny anonymities.”10  Holmes wrote that “[t]he best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” and that “the 
theory of our Constitution” is that judgments about such statements belonged to 
 
to explore the question of the novel’s responsibility to truth”).  
 5. For a compelling meditation on tolerance as “respect,” see EVA BRANN, HOMAGE TO 
AMERICANS: MILE-HIGH MEDITATIONS, CLOSE READINGS, AND TIME-SPANNING SPECULATIONS 17 
(2010) (defining democratic respect as “a knowledgeable favoritism, open-eyed prejudice for persons 
and for the most revealing expression of their personhood, namely, their individual humanity: their 
opinions”).  See also Glenn Tinder, Freedom of Expression, The Strange Imperative, 69 YALE REV. 161, 
162, 167, 173 (1979) (positing that “the crucial mark of respect for a human being is recognizing that he 
cannot be classified and used but must be encountered and heard,” and suggesting that “truth cannot be 
held by one person alone but is in essence a shared reality.”  Tinder suggests that truth “is entered into 
through dialogue, and effective dialogue must be ironic and inconclusive”).  Id. at 173.   
 6. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 625. 
 8. Id. at 628. 
 9. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 427–28 
(1993) (recounting chronology of “the major change in Holmes’ attitude toward free speech” in the 
summer and fall of 1919); THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT 193–97 (2013) (describing impact on 
Holmes of his friend Harold Laski’s difficulties at Harvard University after speaking out publicly in 
support of a police strike). 
 10. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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citizens, not courts.11  A variation on the same theme—that “truth” can be 
advanced by safeguarding a free flow of information, whether true or false, right or 
wrong—was voiced decades later when Justice William Brennan, writing for the 
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, asserted that legal protection of 
at least some false speech about public issues was necessary to minimize the law’s 
chill of truthful expression.12  Sullivan’s emphasis on creating conditions for 
uncovering  true facts about the pressing problems of American life  was 
contemporaneous with Martin Luther King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail, in 
which King implored the nation to face the “hard, brutal facts” of racial injustice 
and to “bring [this truth] out in the open, where it [could] be seen and dealt with.”13  
The two documents—King’s Letter and Brennan’s opinion for the Court in 
Sullivan—represented a high-water mark in the legal culture’s commitment to 
protecting speech that discloses, against great odds, the plain face of social fact. 
For all their eloquence, Holmes, Brennan, and King were echoing a theme 
declared on native soil long before any of them lived, indeed long before 
independence—the 1735 courtroom argument of attorney Andrew Hamilton in his 
defense of John Peter Zenger, printer of the New-York Weekly Journal.14  When 
Zenger was prosecuted for sedition in New York Colony for printing mocking 
criticism of a corrupt royal governor, Hamilton demanded the right to defend on the 
ground of the writing’s truth, explicitly invoking the spirit of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 and the strand of Enlightenment thought holding that free 
articulation of truthful statements about those in power was an essential tool against 
tyranny.15  Even though the colonial court rejected the idea of a defense of truth in 
sedition cases, the jury acquitted Zenger.  In the aftermath, Hamilton’s oration was 
printed and reprinted throughout the colonies, and a new strain of public expression 
had won a round in the fight for legal legitimacy.16 
Summarizing two centuries of free speech tradition in this country, Professor 
Thomas Emerson in 1970 identified the truth-seeking value as a fundamental 
component of the First Amendment.17  “Freedom of expression is an essential 
process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth,” he wrote.  “An individual 
who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question, consider all 
alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and make full use of 
 
 11. Id. at 630.  For a perceptive reading of Abrams, noting differences between the statutes 
involved in that case and those in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), see Robert Post, 
Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE 
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds. 2002) 153, 154–61. 
 12. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
 13. Martin Luther King, Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in JONATHAN RIEDER, GOSPEL 
OF FREEDOM 169, 171, 177 (2013). 
 14. See generally JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN 
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (Paul Finkelman ed. 2010) (1736). 
 15. Id. at 96–97 (quoting Zenger’s attorney, Andrew Hamilton). 
 16. Lincoln Barnett, The Case of John Peter Zenger, AM. HERITAGE, Dec. 1971, http://
www.americanheritage.com/content/case-john-peter-zenger [http://perma.cc/CH8S-YVDU].  
 17. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). 
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different minds.”18  Emerson’s goal was not to defend a philosophical position 
about the accessibility of “truth” or even to propose a specific theory of truth-
seeking as a legal idea.  Instead, writing in broad strokes, Emerson spoke of truth-
seeking in a way that had particular resonance in 1970, a time of active conflict in 
America over civil rights and the Vietnam War, when the need for nonironic 
devotion to pursuing “political truth” was absolutely compelling. 
Yet, despite these instances in which the truth-seeking value commanded center 
stage in speech disputes, courts in more recent decades have seldom invoked the 
value in more than a perfunctory way.  Even when they have referred to it, they 
have rarely paused over its meaning or relevance.19  Courts have preferred to 
invoke other recognized First Amendment values—most often, the self-governance 
value, which protects expression as the engine of civic participation in a 
democracy, or the self-realization value, which protects expression for its role in 
the individual’s exercise (or pursuit of) autonomy.20  Perhaps ideas of self-
governance and self-realization are more accessible in meaning or more acceptable 
in theory than the goal of truth-seeking, which may strike a contemporary jurist as 
abstract, arrogant, illusory, or antidemocratic.  Or perhaps contemporary jurists 
believe that the self-governance and self-realization values are specifications of a 
broader value associated with truth-seeking, and that tracing the link is 
unnecessary.  Whatever the reason, the absence of a strongly enunciated truth-
seeking value may be at least partially responsible for the strange results in a host 
of contemporary cases in which a clear commitment of that kind might have made 
a difference.21 
In those cases, courts struggled towards unsatisfying outcomes in cases 
involving statements that were either factually true or could easily have been seen 
as nonfactual expressions of opinion.  Thus, in Hatfill v. New York Times Co., a 
suspect in the 2001 anthrax killings was able to entangle the Times in libel 
litigation for five years, even though the op-ed columns at issue pointedly refrained 
from accusing him of a crime and stated accurate facts as a basis for urging the FBI 
to investigate the man aggressively.22  The truth-seeking value appeared powerless 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Professor Horwitz observes that “[w]here deep questions about the nature of truth and falsity 
are concerned, courts will rely on general statements and incompletely theorized agreements and leave 
the theorizing to others.”  Horwitz, supra note 1, at 488. 
 20. See Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARV.  C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
443 (1998); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Governance Value, 14 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1251 (2006).  For a discerning study of “free speech theory at the second-order level,” see R. George 
Wright, Dominance and Diversity: A Risk-Reduction Approach to Free Speech Law, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1 (1999).   
 21. Professor Schauer has complained that the free speech tradition “has essentially nothing to 
say” about the “widespread existence of public falsity.”  Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First 
Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 912 (2009).  The present Article attempts to give a fresh look at 
what the courts have assumed and written about questions of truth and falsity and to explore the 
implications of the courts’ statements and silences. 
 22. 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005).  Here, an appellate panel reversed the district court’s 2004 grant 
of a motion to dismiss.  The panel ruled that op-ed columns in the Times could be found to have 
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to protect the Times from years of litigation about whether it was accusing the 
plaintiff of a crime, and if so, whether it knew the accusation was false or doubted 
its truth.23  A sturdier background understanding of the truth-seeking value surely 
could have made a difference.  In another case, Noonan v. Staples, Inc., a corporate 
executive sent emails to his staff that accurately stated that an employee had been 
fired for violating company policy.24  Yet the emails became the basis of a libel 
action that survived summary judgment in federal district court and survived 
appellate review as well.25  Again, the truth-seeking value went unrecognized, 
incapable of disposing the case at the outset.  In still another case, Salzano v. North 
Jersey Media Group, Inc., the fair report privilege failed to protect a newspaper that 
had published an article truthfully reporting the contents of a complaint that had 
been filed in a bankruptcy proceeding.26  The article repeated the complaint’s 
allegations of wrongdoing by the plaintiff.  The state court of appeals showed no 
reluctance to affirm precedent that truthful reporting of a filed complaint fell 
outside of the privilege of fair report.27  Although the state’s high court ultimately 
ruled for the newspaper and changed the rule, the result came far too late in the 
day.28  The absence of a clearly stated truth-seeking value arguably contributed to 
the courts’ remarkable missteps in these cases. 
In contrast, other recent cases do invoke the truth-seeking value and demonstrate 
its tantalizing depth, scope, and vitality.  The discussions in those cases provide 
partial scaffolding for this Article’s reconsideration of the value’s history, purpose, 
and potential.  Although the value’s effect in these cases is at best uncertain, the 
 
defamed the plaintiff by imputing to him the murders of five people who were exposed to the anthrax 
letters.  Id. at 331.  In a dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, 
Judge Wilkinson argued strongly that the Times “was simply doing its job”—that is, “urg[ing] the 
investigation of an undeniable public threat,” while “expressly avoid[ing] premature accusation” of the 
plaintiff.”  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 427 F.3d 253, 256–57, 259 (4th Cir. 2005) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting). 
 23. Summary judgment for the New York Times was finally granted in 2007 and was affirmed in 
mid-2008.  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 532 F.3d 312, 315 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 24. 556 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2009).  Here, state law provided that “even a true statement can form the 
basis of a libel action if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with ‘actual malice.’”  Id. at 28.  
The rule came from a 1902 state statute. 
 25. The panel noted that truth was indeed a defense in cases involving matters of public concern, 
but declined to consider the constitutional question in the present case, which was considered to involve 
a matter of private concern.  Id. at 28 n.7.  The court’s reason was that the issue had not been briefed at 
trial or “developed” on appeal.  Id.  On a petition for rehearing en banc, the First Circuit refused to reach 
any question of the First Amendment.  The court’s reason was that the issue was not “so clear that the 
panel should have acted sua sponte” to strike down the 1902 statute.  Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 561 
F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 2009).  In addition, the court declined to certify the question to the state’s high court.  
Id. at 7. 
 26. 993 A.2d 778 (N.J. 2010). 
 27. “Although the panel [of the middle-level court] concluded that the report was a full, fair, and 
accurate report of the bankruptcy complaint, it recognized the initial pleadings exception and declared 
that the fair-report privilege did not apply.”  Id. at 784. 
 28. The court held that “the public policy underpinning of the fair-report privilege—advancement 
of the public’s interest in the free flow of information about official actions—would be thwarted by the 
recognition of the initial pleadings exception.”  Id. at 791. 
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decisions are notable for the breadth of First Amendment issues they consciously 
link to the truth-seeking value:  whether to recognize a common-law privilege for 
news reporters subpoenaed to a grand jury; whether to uphold a statute 
criminalizing false claims of receiving military honors; and whether to uphold a 
“buffer zone” law preventing sidewalk conversations between prolife “counselors” 
and those entering the premises of an abortion provider. 
In the first case, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, Judge David S. Tatel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit cited the truth-seeking value of 
the press as a strong reason to recognize a common-law privilege protecting the 
identity of a journalist’s source even in the context of a grand jury subpoena, on the 
theory that the privilege would promote the “free flow of information” to citizens.29  
Judge Tatel, who concurred in the panel’s judgment that the journalist must testify, 
broadly defined the truth-seeking function as “exposing corruption among public 
officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and 
occurrences.”30  Implicit in this discussion was a belief that although the “flow of 
information” made possible by the privilege over time would probably include true 
as well as false information, the true information, either in amount or significance, 
would justify the privilege by assisting citizens in making sense of current affairs 
and in formulating political opinions.  Although the two other judges on the panel 
declined to join Judge Tatel’s analysis,31 they did not repudiate his discussion of 
the truth-seeking value, and indeed, his approach has informed the thinking of other 
judges as well as legislative drafts of a federal shield law.32  At the very least, 
Judge Tatel’s linkage of truth-seeking to the concept of privilege in the grand jury 
context usefully identifies the value’s ultimate objective:  facilitating an increased 
“flow of information” to citizens engaged in evaluation of a range of political 
issues. 
In the second case, United States v. Alvarez, a plurality of Justices focused not 
so much on the desired flow of information as on the proper locus of determination 
of information’s truth or falsity, in this case facts about the receipt of military 
honors.33  The Stolen Valor Act made it a crime to lie about receiving such honors, 
even with no showing that the lie was told to defame a third party or to obtain 
financial gain.34  The Supreme Court struck down the relevant provision of the Act, 
 
 29. 438 F.3d 1141, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 1163 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965)). 
 31. Compare Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 
F.3d at 1147, 1154.  Judge Henderson’s position was that Branzburg had not addressed the matter of 
common-law privilege, but that, even if a common-law privilege applied, the government’s evidentiary 
showing outweighed it.  Id. at 1159. 
 32. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 181, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., 
dissenting) (approving Judge Tatel’s approach); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 
reh’g en banc denied, 428 F.3d 299, 302-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Garland, J., dissenting).  See also Free 
Flow of Information Act of 2013, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s987/ 
[http://perma.cc/QL3V-9PUP] (proposing federal shield law incorporating balancing test in several 
contexts).   
 33. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). 
 34. Id. at 2543. 
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with four Justices relying on the truth-seeking value to protect the false speech in 
question.35  Those Justices—Kennedy, Roberts, Ginsberg, and Sotomayor—
intimated that assessing the truth or falsity of such claims belongs to citizens, not to 
single-issue tribunals set up by the government.36  The plurality feared that 
sustaining the Act would allow Congress to create a phalanx of Orwellian 
“Ministr[ies] of Truth” to decide the simple truth or falsity of other claims, and that 
such laws could lead over time to a chilling of speech.37  A much less intrusive 
method of settling factual questions about military honors would be the creation of 
a government website naming all legitimate recipients.38  Accordingly, these 
Justices insisted that “the remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true,” and 
that “[t]he response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the 
enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the simple truth.”39  Nevertheless, as in the 
reporter’s privilege case, the emphasis in Alvarez on truth-seeking as a First 
Amendment value did not command a majority, perhaps because the meaning and 
implications of the value had been unclear. 
Alvarez informed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit in 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, where the court examined the 
constitutionality of a state law criminalizing knowingly false statements about 
ballot initiatives and erecting an administrative and judicial process for 
adjudicating allegations of falsity.40  The court found that anti-falsity legislation of 
this kind would only “open the door” to abuse:  the law made it too easy for 
“anyone” to level a charge of falsity and thus trigger the statutory legal process, 
disrupting and likely chilling public discourse in the process.41  The court wrote 
that “the citizenry, not the government, should be the monitor of falseness in the 
political arena,” and, quoting Supreme Court precedent, added that “once they have 
done so, it is for them to decide what is responsible, what is valuable, and what is 
truth.”42  In another case striking down an anti-falsity state election law, a federal 
district court signaled the complexity of the citizenry’s task, writing that 
“ultimately, whether or not it is possible to create a system by which impartial 
citizens could identify lies from truth is unclear.”43 
In a third case, McCullen v. Coakley, a majority of the Court (the Chief Justice 
and the left-leaning Justices) did coalesce around the truth-seeking value, at least to 
 
 35. Id. at 2551 (plurality) (concluding that “the Stolen Valor Act infringes upon speech protected 
by the First Amendment”); Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 2547–48 
(plurality) (rejecting “broad censorial power unprecedented in the Court’s cases or in our constitutional 
tradition”); Id. at 2550 (citing Holmes’s assertion that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought 
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”). 
 36. Id. at 2547. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2551.  
 39. Id. at 2550. 
 40. 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1550 (2015). 
 41. Id. at 796, 792. 
 42. Id. at 796 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995)).  
 43. Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 779 (S.D. Ohio 2014).  
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the extent of invoking it to begin analysis of state legislation mandating a wide 
buffer zone for abortion clinics.44  If Judith Miller involved the what of the truth-
seeking value in the sense of a general objective (i.e., the goal of facilitating a flow 
of public information), and if Alvarez focused on who, in the sense of identifying 
the appropriate “judge” of a particular truth question (i.e., citizens rather than a 
tribunal), McCullen dealt with an aspect of the how of truth-seeking, in the sense of 
reflecting on a manner—or temper—of speech concerning an exceptionally 
sensitive public issue and involving not a question of fact but of conscience.  Was 
the opinion itself—in which the temperature of the abortion debate was arguably 
lowered in finding that the statute at issue was content-neutral—a sign that Justices 
of dissimilar philosophies can occasionally find a mode of shared thinking, even in 
highly polarized contexts?  McCullen involved a state law that sought to protect 
public safety and patient access to healthcare by prohibiting pedestrians from 
knowingly standing on a public way or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of an 
abortion-providing clinic.45  Pro-life plaintiffs argued that the buffer zone 
precluded them from engaging in their intended mode of speech, which was 
“sidewalk counseling,” rather than what the Court termed “shouting or brandishing 
signs” or engaging in other forms of “vociferous” protest.46  The Court prefaced its 
discussion by referring to the truth-seeking value of speech, noting that a “virtue” 
of “traditional public fora”—streets and sidewalks—was that they allow actual 
face-to-face contact between speakers and other citizens.47  That sort of 
communicative immediacy is simply not possible with print media, websites, or 
television.48  In striking down the statute, the Justices made no claim that “truth” of 
facts or opinions would suddenly emerge from a sidewalk exchange between 
strangers.  Nor was there any suggestion that truth-seeking itself could easily take 
place on such an issue in such a place.  Yet the Justices’ mention of the mode and 
location of communication in conjunction with their reference to the marketplace of 
ideas did suggest something else about the truth-seeking value:  that, in cases 
involving efforts at moral suasion, the value embraces an idea that progress towards 
truth is made possible by respectful exchange—even in the face of strong 
difference about what conscience requires.  In 2010, sounding a similar theme in a 
case concerning freedom of speech and association in state law schools, Justice 
Kennedy wrote “that a view’s validity should be tested through free and open 
discussion,” and that a “vibrant dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves 
off from opposing points of view.”49  Again, the idea was that truth-seeking, at 
least in settings not dominated by factual questions, counsels against self-isolation 
 
 44. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (referring to the First Amendment’s “purpose ‘to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail’”) (citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 2525. 
 46. Id. at 2527, 2537. 
 47. Id. at 2529. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of U.C. Hastings v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 706 (2010) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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and urges interaction and exchange.  But more from the Justices in these cases was 
not forthcoming. 
This Article argues that a clearer understanding of the truth-seeking value is 
possible, that it can and should be brought to light, and that it should enter the 
courts’ calculations in a range of speech cases.  The argument is not that this value 
should take precedence in all cases, but that it plays a more explicit and careful part 
in the conversation.  Part I of the Article shows that the newer traces of legal 
interest in this value are matched by commentaries in other disciplines, noting that 
the concept of truth, at least as properly understood, merits fresh regard and 
explication.  Part II then delves into several narratives of truth-seeking in order to 
ask why the value has such staying power.  Finding that the concept of a “search 
for truth” has a surprisingly complex pedigree, Part II explores narratives of 
security, political enlightenment, and virtue, and finds that the “search for truth” as 
an organizing trope is able to address human ingenuity, struggle, tragedy, and 
wisdom.  The trope’s richness in these narratives, allowing oscillations between a 
focus on “truth” as knowledge prized by society, and a focus on “seeking” as the 
individual’s activity of trial and error in developing moral awareness, may help 
explain its survival in contemporary consciousness.  Part III of the Article turns to 
the truth-seeking value in legal disputes over the freedom of speech and press.  It 
finds that courts approach truth in different ways, depending on whether the case 
concerns truth about the past, the present, or the future.  The temporality of a given 
case’s truth issue has much to do with the courts’ perception of its utility, and the 
latter perception informs the creation and application of legal doctrine.  At the same 
time, pragmatic courts are reluctant to dig deeply in examining truth-seeking 
through speech.  Part III draws on recent works of fiction—by Booker Prize-
winning authors Paul Scott, Kazuo Ishiguro, and Ian McEwan——to fill some of 
the gaps in the law’s justifications.  Part IV closes the analysis by considering the 
truth-seeking value of the First Amendment in perhaps its most difficult 
contemporary setting—the world of money and politics in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission.50 
I.  RENEWED INTEREST ACROSS DISCIPLINES 
The inconclusive references to truth-seeking in the cases mentioned in the 
Introduction—where truth-seeking was either ignored or invoked with emphasis 
but little elaboration—might signal that this value has little actual resonance today.  
Some might even ask whether truth-seeking should remain on the list of First 
Amendment values at all.  Is it still worthwhile to talk of truth-seeking as a function 
of constitutional negative liberty in a period in which “appeals to truth, whether 
made by powerful public figures or in ordinary private disagreements” are often 
greeted with cynicism?51  In The Concept of Truth, Richard Campbell notes several 
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commonplace causes of “deep and pervasive disillusion” about truth:  high-profile 
deceptions by those in public life, exaggerated advertising of consumer products, 
and perceived bias of mass media in reporting news.52  Other factors add to the 
public’s fading faith in truth:  accounts of eyewitnesses and experts alike are often 
proven mistaken and even the hard sciences are “riven by deep theoretical 
inconsistencies.”53  Campbell notes too that our “trouble with truth” extends 
beyond mere facts:  as communications technologies increase our exposures to 
other cultures and ways of living, the validity of moral truths “claimed by particular 
cultural traditions” become more and more suspect.54  Political theorist Stephen 
White similarly notes the passing of unquestioned claims about the world, human 
nature, and the existence of God, and replacement of these certainties by “weak 
ontologies” that take “all fundamental conceptualizations of self, other, and world” 
to be “contestable.”55 
A preliminary question, then, is whether a truth-seeking value of speech and 
press should matter at all.  While some scholars credit truth-seeking as the First 
Amendment’s “dominant value”56 and “the most influential argument”57 for 
expressive freedom, others see it as an exhausted holdover from the Enlightenment, 
at best a remnant of belief in the power of discussion and debate to increase human 
knowledge.58  The search for truth, according to some, has little strength in a 
virtually unregulated media market where, even with the Internet, competing points 
of view seldom interact.59  And even if the truth-seeking had a stable core of 
meaning, the First Amendment has been “toothless to deal with the problem of 
public factual falsity.”60 
Yet the vocabulary of truth-seeking, however qualified, persists in U.S. thought.  
As one commentator has put it, American journalism and other “practical 
professions and crafts” can be considered “spheres of pragmatic truth.”61  As 
members of a “craft dedicated to the rapid ascertainment of facts,” journalists track 
“what is happening” but operate under inherent limitations of accepted rituals: 
“their knowledge and vantage point [are] necessarily limited; they have to 
triangulate within hours; deadlines always loom”; and they follow a “creed” which 
 
 52. Id. at 2–3. 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. STEVEN K. WHITE, SUSTAINING AFFIRMATION: THE STRENGTHS OF WEAK ONTOLOGY IN 
POLITICAL THEORY 8 (2000).  
 56. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986) (stating that “[t]hrough the process of 
open discussion we find out what we ourselves think and are then able to compare that with what others 
think on the same issues.  The end result of this process, we hope, is that we will arrive at as close to an 
approximation of the truth as we can.”). 
 57. William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 
30 GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995). 
 58. Schauer, supra note 21, at 909. 
 59. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
927, 945 (2011). 
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requires a process of research, investigation, writing, editing, publishing, and 
correcting error.62  The process and creed enable journalists to declare that the “first 
obligation” and “first principle” of their profession is the “disinterested pursuit of 
truth,” even if it is a “functional truth” involving two distinct tasks:  “getting the 
facts straight,” on the one hand, and “making sense of the facts,” on the other.63  
The first concerns accuracy, the second acknowledges the role of interpretation.  
One journalism textbook portrays news coverage of events as a “continuing journey 
toward understanding—that begins with the first account of an event and builds 
over time.”64 
In a 2007 book, Journalism and Truth, Tom Goldstein, former dean of the 
Columbia Journalism School, insists on the staying power of this sort of journalistic 
truth-seeking and unpacks more of its complexity.  He notes that early twentieth-
century reporters, following Walter Lippmann, began subscribing to norms of 
accuracy and objectivity almost precisely when “intellectuals and artists were 
moving away from objectivity.”65  In exploring “how journalists think about the 
idea of truth and how close they come to attaining it,” Goldstein acknowledges that 
the profession’s norms of accuracy and objectivity are less exacting than those of 
the scientific method and historical research, and he urges journalists to “refine 
their techniques by learning and appreciating how people in other disciplines go 
about their work.”66  Better research and less tolerance of a herd instinct might 
have prevented some of the glaring journalistic misses of recent times, such as the 
erroneous attribution of combat heroics to Army private Jessica Lynch in the Iraq 
war, the mistaken reporting of widespread child rapes and other lurid violence in 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and the factual errors published in the 
immediate aftermath of the school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut.67  But 
Goldstein’s interest in journalistic truth ranges beyond a concern about rushed or 
careless reporting.  For example, he has no patience for attempts to justify literally 
untrue news stories on the ground that they serve some “larger” or “essential” 
truth.68  At the same time, he disparages examples of “literal” truth, such as 
reporter Judith Miller’s series in the New York Times on weapons of mass 
destruction in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  Although Miller’s articles 
may have accurately reported that highly-placed U.S. officials believed that the 
weapons existed in Iraq, Goldstein argues that reporters should be more than mere 
 
 62. Id. at 30, 27. 
 63. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 4, at 49, 55–57. 
 64. Id. at 57. 
 65. TOM GOLDSTEIN, JOURNALISM AND TRUTH: STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 37 (2007). 
 66. Id. at 1, 17. 
 67. W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, GETTING IT WRONG:  TEN OF THE GREATEST MISREPORTED STORIES 
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conduits for reporting what officials believe or what sources disclose.69 
Goldstein therefore would probably have approved the cautious steps of the New 
York Times in 2010 when Julian Assange shared with the Times half a million 
leaked military dispatches from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As Times 
executive editor Bill Keller wrote, the newspaper’s position was that it had “an 
enormous moral and ethical obligation to use the material responsibly,” and its 
reporters combed through the documents, assessed them to the extent possible for 
authenticity, “excise[d] material that could put lives at risk,” and provided context 
in articles based on the documents.70  For Keller, journalistic truth involves more 
than transparency.  It is “pragmatic” in the sense of faithful to a conscious process 
of sifting and selection of material based on norms of credibility, reasonable time 
constraints, and a purpose to avoid causing needless harm.71 
Another press commentator, Mitchell Stephens of New York University’s 
School of Journalism, links the idea of “pragmatic truth” to a post-modernist 
sensibility that “currently seems inescapable in journalism.”72  Stephens declares 
that “[w]e are all postmodern now,” in the sense of acknowledging the 
impossibility of perfect or even near-perfect objectivity in describing the world or 
recording its events.73  At the same time, Stephens cautions journalists against 
convincing themselves “that, since everything comes down to interpretation 
anyway, there is no point in digging deeper.”74  Perhaps referring to Miller’s WMD 
series, Stephens insists that reporters must “move beyond spin to what is, to use a 
possibly out of date word, really happening.”75  They must “still provide their 
audiences with as much of the information needed to make a judgment as 
possible,” and “they should take their audiences as close as possible to truth.”76  
Stephens uses “truth” without embarrassment.  In a guide for prospective court 
reporters, one author (a former journalist) writes, “For me the process of 
verification was constant:  I reached out to as many people as I could, given the 
constraints of a deadline, to check what I had heard.  I repeatedly asked myself, 
who else would know if this were true?”77 
A credo of this kind may describe at least a portion of “citizen journalism,” 
whose practitioners are engaged in everything from electronic news coverage to 
attention-grabbing rants and self-disclosures.  Scholars tracking the rise and 
influence of bloggers have tried to nail down the role, if any, of a truth-seeking 
value in cyberspace.  According to Professor Jane Singer, bloggers “do not see 
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truth as resting on the decision of one autonomous individual or group of 
individuals within a news organization or anywhere else.78  Instead, bloggers see 
truth as emerging from shared, collective knowledge—from an electronically 
enabled marketplace of ideas.”79 
The late British philosopher Bernard Williams likely would have approved this 
guardedly persistent use of the vocabulary of truth among journalists.  Williams did 
not espouse a view that one could find an independent-of-self standpoint from 
which to see and know the world, but in his final book, Truth and Truthfulness, he 
shrewdly noted that “two currents of ideas are very prominent in modern thought”: 
on the one hand, “an intense commitment to truthfulness—or at any rate, a 
pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, an eagerness to see 
through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie behind them,” and 
on the other hand, “an equally pervasive suspicion about truth itself: whether there 
is such a thing; if there is, whether it can be more than relative or subjective or 
something of that kind; altogether, whether we should bother about it, in carrying 
out our activities or in giving an account of them.”80  Williams shared the latter 
suspicions.  Although he thought that objective truths were possible in physical 
science (at least in narrow, specific ways), such truths were not possible in ethics.81  
For Williams, ethical truths were “relative to culture.”82  But he also stressed the 
“commonsense” notion of “everyday truths,” which he wrote “can readily and 
reasonably be counted as facts.”83  Williams took pains to recall that Frederic 
Nietzsche, who in one place defined truth as “a movable host of metaphors, 
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,” elsewhere accepted that “there are facts to 
be respected,” praised the ancients for their “sense for facts, the last-developed and 
most valuable of all the senses,” and wrote that English psychologists were brave 
creatures “who have been taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, every truth, even a 
plain, bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral truth—Because there are such 
truths.”84  Williams was interested in truth less as a philosophical “than as a 
politically salient idea,” and his book detailed what he called “the values of truth”:  
sincerity, which he defined as honest representation of the self, and accuracy, 
which he defined as avoidance of “wishful thinking or intellectual laziness.”85  He 
insisted that these virtues were essential to political liberalism, especially to the 
protection of the weak from the powerful.  This he called “the anti-tyranny 
 
 78. Jane Singer, Contested Autonomy: Professional and Popular Claims on Journalistic Norms, 8 
JOURNALISM STUDIES 79, 85 (2007). 
 79. Id. 
 80. BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 1 (2002). 
 81. William Greenway, Modern Metaphysics, Dangerous Truth, Post-Moral Ethics: The 
Revealing Vision of Bernard Williams, 51 PHILOSOPHY TODAY 137, 139–40 (2007). 
 82. Id. at 140. 
 83. WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 10. 
 84. Id. at 16, 145. 
 85. Matthew Sleat, On the Relationship between Truth and Liberal Politics, 50 INQUIRY 288, 
291–92 (2006). 
MURCHISON, SPEECH AND THE TRUTH-SEEKING VALUE, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55 (2015)  
70 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:1 
 
argument” for the virtues of truth.86  Williams went so far as to insist that the 
virtues of truthfulness had intrinsic rather than merely instrumental value.  And he 
maintained that grasping these virtues as intrinsic would be essential as Western 
culture awakes to a “totally disenchanted, completely de-Platonized intellectual 
world.”87 
Williams stood at a distance from Richard Rorty, who advocated “dropping the 
idea of truth,” which he saw as a “God surrogate” and thus an “unprofitable 
topic.”88  Rorty’s goal was to “scrub away the illusions and myths that cling” to the 
old concept of truth.89  Like Williams, Rorty claimed Nietzsche as a guide, but he 
did so for the view that “we would be stronger, freer, better human beings if we 
could bring ourselves to dispense with all such surrogates.”90  The “search for 
truth” was best thought of as “a particular species of the search for happiness.”91  
For Rorty, the moral virtues of “truthfulness, sincerity, exactness, and trust” did not 
depend on any concept of truth, but could exist readily enough “by reference to our 
practices of justification.”92  Rorty stressed that a different vocabulary—such as 
that provided by the language of practical reason, rather than by assertions about 
“reality”—provided a more “desirable self-image” for human beings and would 
lead to less oppressive social dynamics.93  Several commentators believe that 
Williams had the better of the argument, one maintaining that for purposes of the 
antityranny argument, the truth vocabulary advocated by Williams was less subject 
to manipulation than the truth-eschewing justifications of Rorty,94 another arguing 
that Rorty’s arguments may be right that we lack a “substantive theoretical 
account” of knowledge but wrong for denying even “humdrum truths of common 
sense (we might even say, of sanity) that express the reality of our world and our 
everyday knowledge of it.”95  Eugene Garver expresses a Rortyan view when he 
writes that the “success of liberal democracy depends on lowering one’s ambitions 
from seeking truth to settling for agreement.”96 
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The Williams-Rorty exchange prompts the question:  Is democracy incompatible 
with the “search for truth”?  Michael Lynch protests the view that “the proper 
response to skeptical arguments [about truth] is to acknowledge the groundlessness 
of our believing, roll up our sleeves, and go on from there.”97  For Lynch, truth has 
a place in politics, and the relation stems from a vision of equality.  Lynch bases his 
alternative approach on a conception of liberal democracy, defined in part as “the 
fundamental social practice of not simply acting, but of acting in concert with one 
another.”98  Action of this kind entails discussion of issues and claims, and 
disagreement among citizens is inevitable.  How is disagreement to be handled?  
The answer begins with the recognition of a central democratic ideal:  Citizens are 
“rational, autonomous agents worthy of equal respect under the law” and “capable 
of making judgments about what one ought to believe.”99  When agents disagree, 
democratic respect requires a practice of giving reasons for positions and decisions 
and taking care not to usurp the decision-making of others.  On this view, 
democracy is “a space of reasons,” and it is here that Lynch brings truth into the 
analysis.100  By “space of reasons,” he means that citizens, wherever possible, 
should justify their positions by explaining why they think one view of relevant 
facts is closer to the truth than another.  On this view, giving truth-aiming reasons 
respects the autonomy of fellow citizens and amounts to the best “common 
currency” for political argumentation.101  Rorty and others would argue that such 
reason-giving should be based on what can produce consensus—“principles we can 
all accept”—and should not be linked to potentially divisive, disrespecting claims 
of truth.102  But Lynch makes a strong case that truth-aiming reasons do not violate 
democratic respect:  “[T]he common reasons we all do recognize as reasons are 
reasons for thinking that some belief is true.”103  Lynch maintains that “aiming at 
the truth in political argument” is not only consistent with, but required by, the 
Rawlsian “principle of toleration,” which Lynch argues does not preclude truth-
aiming arguments—although, practically speaking, it might well “limit the stock 
[of truth-aiming reasons] from which we draw.”104 
While the Williams-Rorty-Lynch debate continues in philosophical precincts, 
political theory is showing its own renewed interest in the connection, if any, of 
truth to politics.  A recent compilation of trenchant essays, Truth and Democracy, 
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reflects that interest.  Backing Williams’s insistence on preserving the role of truth, 
Jeremy Elkins and Andrew Norris situate the discussion in the world of what they 
call “real politics,” involving debates about what the facts involved in a particular 
issue are and how they should be evaluated.105  “It is hard to maintain,” they write, 
“that it makes no difference how attentive we are to the specific conditions of the 
world that we seek to affect, or that the quality of the decisions that we make is 
wholly unrelated to the strength of the evidence behind them and the care of the 
analysis underlying them.”106  They point out that, although “there will obviously 
always be differences of judgment—about the evidence itself, about what to do 
about it, and so on—even with respect to the political-philosophical differences that 
come into play, most will believe that at least their own views are based on truthful 
(if contested) propositions about the world.”107  These theorists acknowledge the 
possibilities that truth-aiming arguments can make consensus difficult and at the 
same time can thwart a “healthy dissensus” (by bringing “a history of metaphysical 
baggage” and the specter of “political domination”).108  But they posit that “a 
serious engagement with the problems of social life cannot do without questions of 
truth; that questions about truth are inevitable in any society that takes politics 
seriously; and that questions of truth are not adequately resolved by dispensing 
with them.”109 
If nothing else, this summary demonstrates that truth-seeking remains an 
important if enigmatic component of contemporary thought across disciplines.  As 
such, it provides a backdrop and partial rationale for this Article’s consideration of 
truth-seeking’s place in First Amendment jurisprudence.  Perhaps the law’s 
reticence to pinpoint the meaning of the truth-seeking value of expressive freedoms 
has something in common with the ideas summarized above:  an awareness of the 
limitations of strong theories of truth along with a conviction that “functional truth” 
and truthfulness remain useful, even necessary, concepts. 
II.  NARRATIVES OF TRUTH-SEEKING 
If truth and truth-seeking are subjects of renewed interest in the law and across 
disciplines, a question worthy of further exploration is:  why?  This Part discusses 
several narratives that yield unexpectedly complex accounts of the benefits 
associated with truth-seeking.  Some of the narratives focus on virtues that truth-
seeking affords the seeker, vindicating the practice and showing its centrality to a 
way of life.  Other narratives focus on the political and social effects of truth-
seeking, most stressing the social “progress” it has enabled.  But not all the 
narratives are vindicatory, some emphasizing its difficulties and tragic excesses. 
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A.  TRUTH AND SURVIVAL 
In 2006, in a brief meditation entitled On Truth, Harry G. Frankfurt explored 
reasons for truth’s importance.  First on the list was “the thought that truth often 
possesses very considerable practical utility” for societies wishing to “make 
sufficiently well-informed judgments and decisions concerning the most suitable 
disposition of its public business.”110  In broad strokes, Frankfurt pointed out that a 
society’s basic survival could depend on “knowing enough about relevant facts . . . 
to cope prudently and effectively with its problems.”111  Bernard Williams 
expanded on this idea—the instrumental reasons for truth’s centrality—in Truth 
and Truthfulness.  He examined the concepts in his title from the perspective of 
naturalism, which, according to one of its proponent asks, “How is it that creatures 
like us, inhabiting the kinds of physical, interpersonal, and cultural environments 
we do, come to have the values we do . . . ?”112  To answer this, he employed the 
method of genealogy, developing what he called an “imagined developmental 
story.”113  Williams’s premise was that the traditional verities that might be thought 
to underlie a commitment to truthfulness are no longer available to moderns, and 
that a naturalistic “developmental” narrative was the only plausible entrée to an 
understanding of truth’s importance.114  He began by imagining an “elementary 
society”—a “state of nature” comprised of a group of human beings whose “basic 
needs and limitations” included “the need for co-operation.”115  They live in “a 
small society” and share “a common language, with no elaborate technology and no 
form of writing.”  They divide labor, including the pooling of information.116  In 
fact, the group’s survival depends on pooling, which Williams says is one of “those 
objectives [that are] important to almost every human purpose.”117  With survival at 
stake, certain crucial “dispositions” are therefore encouraged and valued, 
particularly the two stressed by Williams:  accuracy, the quality of taking care in 
gathering information so that one gets one’s beliefs “right,” and sincerity, the 
quality of honesty in communicating what one actually believes the gathered 
information is.118  In Williams’s view, “People need to be reliable observers, and 
other people need to be able to trust what they say.”119  The “virtues of truth” 
therefore involve resistance to fantasy, wishful thinking, and lies.  Williams had 
much more to say about the virtues of truth, particularly his sense that their value 
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was intrinsic rather than merely instrumental.  Those ideas will be explored in 
Section C below, under the heading, “Truth and Character.” 
Frankfurt’s and Williams’s insights on truth’s connection to survival are 
elaborated in compelling fashion by dystopian literature such as 1984 by George 
Orwell, in which authoritarian government forbids any questioning of its monstrous 
orthodoxy.  Facts of everyday life are manipulated, changed, or “forgotten” to suit 
the state’s agenda of total control over thought and action.120  In such a world, 
devotion to truth amounts to a desperate hold on sanity itself.121  “Truth” in 
Orwell’s story is connected to survival not in the sense of a society’s pooling of 
information to resist threats from the outside, but in the sense of one person’s 
uniting with another to resist threats from the inside—from the state itself.  
Winston Smith and his lover, Julia, risk everything for moments of truthful 
interaction:  Their honesty with each other permits a precious respite from state-
mandated falsifications of reality.  When they share their beliefs with a third 
person, a state official, they momentarily rejoice in the occasion to expand their 
circle of honesty—until they are betrayed.122  Orwell traces Winston’s subsequent 
torture and “re-education,” which culminates in surrender and a seemingly final 
acceptance of the regime’s declaration that 2 + 2 = 5.  Winston “survives” 
physically, but, as Orwell puts it, a bullet has entered his brain.123 
There is no shortage of real-life dissidents who invoke truth for its life-and-death 
relevance.  One was Zbigniew Herbert, poet of Polish resistance in the latter half of 
the twentieth century and witness to Soviet control and its complex, often bitter 
aftermath.  Herbert gave voice to the struggle to speak freely and to sculpt his own 
vision of civilization, defining his vocation in terms of “reality.”  He wrote, “The 
poet’s sphere of action, if his attitude toward his work is serious, is not the 
‘contemporary’—which I take to mean the state of our current knowledge about 
society, politics, and science—but the real, the stubborn dialogue of man with the 
concrete reality surrounding him, with this table, with that neighbor, with this time 
of day:  the cultivation of a dwindling capacity for contemplation.”124  A fellow 
poet, Seamus Heaney, wrote of one of Herbert’s books that its “true subject is 
survival of the valid self, of the city, of the good and the beautiful; or rather the 
 
 120. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic ed., 1981), at 16 (telescreen carries image of 
denounced rebel, “sole guardian of truth and sanity in a world of lies”), 32 (state changes facts of the 
past, such that “if all others accepted the lie which the Party imposed—if all records told the same tale—
then the lie passed into history and became truth”), 38 (“vaporized” enemies of the state “were therefore 
considered never to have existed”), 179 (“There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the 
truth even against the whole world, you were not mad.”). 
 121. WILLIAMS, supra note 80, at 147 (discussing Orwell). 
 122. ORWELL, supra note 120, at 105 (lovers’ embrace was “a blow struck against the Party. It was 
a political act”), 182-185 (arrest by Thought Police). 
 123. ORWELL, supra note 120, at 239 (Winston tracing the false equation in dust), 245 (accepting 
Big Brother). 
 124. Zbigniew Herbert, quoted in James Marcus, Zbigniew Herbert: An Introduction, WORDS 
WITHOUT BORDERS, http://wordswithoutborders.com/dispatches/article/zbigniew-herbert-an-
introduction [http://perma.cc/YX73-2W6B]. 
MURCHISON, SPEECH AND THE TRUTH-SEEKING VALUE, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55 (2015)  
2015] SPEECH AND THE TRUTH-SEEKING VALUE 75 
 
subject is the responsibility of each person to ensure that survival.”125 
B.  TRUTH AND PROGRESS 
A second truth narrative has its origin in the classical Enlightenment, which, 
whether it was a “philosophical project” or a “social movement,” was undoubtedly 
a “transformative moment in Western history,” famously described as “‘man’s 
release from self-incurred immaturity’ through the use of reason.”126  The 
Enlightenment narrative has elements of survival through truth, to be sure, but it is 
primarily a story of going beyond survival and provoking change in political and 
moral life throughout the West.  Capturing the sense of ideas fueling reform, one 
commentator calls the Enlightenment “an assault on the past in the name of the 
future.”127  Enlightenment thought, while varied in emphasis and intensity 
throughout its domain, uniformly focused on the individual’s freedom and capacity 
to search for truth other than the truth of king or church—in effect, to define his or 
her own existence by thinking and speaking freely with others.128  Since for sheer 
intellectual excitement no other historical period surpasses the classical 
Enlightenment, the headiness of the period lends itself to the sprawling prose of 
Anthony Pagden’s recent book, The Enlightenment (And Why It Still Matters), in 
which he writes:  “If we regard ourselves as modern, if we are forward-looking, if 
we are tolerant and generally open-minded, if stem-cell research does not frighten 
us but fundamentalist religious beliefs do, then we tend to think of ourselves as 
‘enlightened.’  And in thinking this, we are in effect declaring ourselves to be the 
heirs, however distant, of a particular intellectual and cultural movement [which] 
has been identified with an exalted view of human rationality and of human 
benevolence, and with a belief, measured and at time skeptical, in progress and in 
the general human capacity for self-improvement.”129 
The vocabulary of reason in search of truth caught the temper of the classical 
Enlightenment.  As Pagden puts it, the eighteenth-century French philosophers 
explained themselves as seeking “a truth which was independent of the dogmas of 
religion, of fundamentals, and of sects.”  For many thinkers of that period, “it was 
in the moral constitution of man that one had to seek for the foundations of his 
obligations, the origin of his ideas about justice and virtue.”130  The movement 
made an imprint not only on ideas but also on a way of life:  “Enlightenment reason 
[grew] out of a commitment to live by the truth.”131  The sought-for truth was not 
the “revealed truth” of the church, which Enlightenment writers scorned as a blend 
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of “superstition, intolerance, and tyranny,” but the truth of “cold facts,” “the simple 
truth of things.”132  Making no secret of their “aversion to [religious] hocus-pocus,” 
these thinkers displayed eager skepticism and “engaging cynicism” as they traced 
the facts of social conditions and the effects of power, freely sharing “youthful 
blasphemies and talk of hanging the last king in the entrails of the last priest.”133  
Inspired by Newton’s “search into Things themselves,”134 the Enlightenment 
writers studied human life, its setting and psychology, the individual’s connections 
to the world and to others.  They sought “to discover how as a matter of fact the 
outer world of nature behaved, and what as a matter of fact had occurred in times 
past.”135  At the core of the search was a belief in progress:  “that man by deliberate 
intention and rational direction can set the terms and indefinitely improve the 
quality of his mundane existence.”136  The Enlightenment writers had a 
“preoccupation with human welfare,” a “penchant for projects,” all inspired by an 
“ideal of service, the humanitarian impulse to set things right.”137  The idea of 
working in the present for the eventual betterment of mankind was motivated by a 
sense of duty to “posterity” and faith that posterity would warmly recognize all 
efforts made.138  Their vision was to use mankind’s natural faculties “to bring their 
ideas and their conduct, and hence the institutions by which they lived, into 
harmony with the universal natural order.”139  In such a climate, new institutions 
arose “based on the interchange of ideas, rather than to mark or display social and 
political rank,” knowledge was marketed to new and wider audiences, and “public 
opinion” emerged “as a force to be reckoned with.”140 
Whether the Enlightenment lived up to its visions has been a matter of 
substantial debate, as has whether it tragically contained the seeds of twentieth and 
twenty-first century oppressions and despair.  Writing in the 1930s and questioning 
whether French Enlightenment writers had actually “renounced the superstition and 
hocus-pocus of medieval Christian thought,” Carl Becker saw those thinkers as 
“guilty of massive self-deception.”141  Their work, he wrote, was simplistically 
medieval, clinging to the very structures and religious preconceptions that it tried to 
supersede.  To be sure, the French philosophers had rejected “the authority of 
church and the Bible,” Becker noted, “but [they] exhibited a naïve faith in the 
authority of nature and reason.  They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be 
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called philosophers . . . .  They defended toleration valiantly but could with 
difficulty tolerate priests.  They denied that miracles ever happened but believed in 
the perfectibility of the human race.”142  Were they “at once too credulous and too 
skeptical”?  They may have “demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine,” but 
they “rebuil[t] it with more up-to-date materials,” creating nothing short of a 
“religion of humanity.”143  Becker asked how the Enlightenment writers could have 
looked at “the tangled wilderness of the world in this symmetrical, this obvious and 
uncomplicated pattern.”144  How could they have missed that “the nature of man 
was far more perverse, the mind of man far less responsive to rational persuasion 
and humane impulses” than they supposed?  Although the Enlightenment writers 
had believed in “progressive improvement made by the efforts of successive 
generations of men,” Becker in mid-twentieth century America could see only that 
“every effort to shape the world of social relations to humane ends by rational 
means has ended in confusion and defeat.”145  What the Enlightenment had lacked 
was a tragic sense; its reliance on a vision of “perfectibility” could only lead to 
disappointment, and worse, violence.  For Becker, a modern definition of truth 
could be no more than this:  “the perception of discordant experience pragmatically 
adjusted for a particular purpose and for the time being.”146 
In the seventy years since Becker wrote, other doubts about the Enlightenment 
have been regularly voiced—not simply that it was over-optimistic about what 
could be found in the search for truth, or that it was imprisoned in self-defeating 
language, but that its understanding of truth and truth-seeking lacked a necessary 
moral dimension.  In his study of “Gandhi the Philosopher,” Akeel Bilgrami 
examines that self-styled truth-seeker’s own quarrel with the Enlightenment.147  
Gandhi had “undeniably Enlightenment elements in his thought,” Bilgrami 
acknowledges, “including his humanism and the concern that our moral judgments 
be relevant to all people.”  In another sense, however, Gandhi was starkly anti-
Enlightenment, rejecting its conception that truth was “a cognitive notion,” rather 
than “a moral one.”  For Gandhi, the “deepest theoretical source” of the 
Enlightenment’s notion of truth was its “scientific outlook,” which he thought 
regarded truth as merely “a property of sentences or propositions that describe the 
world.”148  Gandhi “recoiled” from that approach because, according to Bilgrami, 
he believed that it “intellectualize[d]” the individual’s relation to society, seeing 
society “as an object of study, study that makes it alien to our moral experience of 
it.”  The cognitive notion of truth embodied the view that “reality [was] something 
to be mastered and conquered, an attitude that leads directly to the technological 
frame of mind that governs modern society.”  That frame of mind, which ignores 
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“communal localities” where “moral experience” and “practical relations to the 
world” have the chance to flourish, focuses instead on “increasingly abstract places 
and structures such as nations and eventually global economies,” producing a 
“moral psychology which ultimately underlies violence in our social relations.”149  
In contrast, Gandhi saw truth as moral in the sense of “experiential.”  On this view, 
truth could only refer to “moral experience,” never to “propositions purporting to 
describe the world.”150  He therefore omitted descriptions of social conditions from 
his understanding of truth, and he reserved the concept for evaluations of 
conditions or moral judgments. 
Gandhi actively used the vocabulary of truth:  his followers were known as 
truth-seekers and practiced satyagraha, or “tenacity in the pursuit of truth.”151  But 
this tenacity had a special meaning.  Gandhi’s methodology of truth-seeking was to 
make one’s moral judgments clear but to refrain from expressing hostility to 
opposing judgments.  Individuals were to hold their moral values modestly, not to 
use them as swords or to inflict them as “principles.”152 This no-hostility rule 
stemmed from a particular conception of moral judgment and its connection to non-
violence.  It was Gandhi’s view that moral criticism of the views of others could 
constitute a first step towards violence, and that the better form of moral 
communication was acting as a moral exemplar, “making visible [a] moral 
stance.”153 
Bilgrami himself cannot quite subscribe to Gandhi’s rejection of the cognitive 
value of truth.  He points out that Gandhi left “a great deal out of our normative 
interest in truth,” including “our tendency to think that apart from the moral virtues 
involving truth (such as truth-telling and living by and exemplifying our moral 
values) there is also in some sense a value or virtue in getting things right about the 
world and discovering the general principles that explain its varied phenomena.”154  
Bilgrami’s analysis forces the question of whether Gandhi exaggerated the failings 
of Enlightenment thought by defining truth too narrowly, perhaps even over-stating 
the threat of violence in hostile speech, and thus under-appreciating the workings of 
politics in getting at truth.155 
Even accepting the strength of these critiques—Becker’s point that 
Enlightenment thought risked repeating the blindness of the religious thought it 
hoped to bury, and Gandhi’s insistence that truth has to mean more than 
propositions about the world—the narrative of searching for truth through the 
“civilizing force” of reason was to ensure progress remains strong in American 
legal thought.156  Two cases, one from the Enlightenment era itself, the other from 
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the twentieth century, underscore this strength.  The first is the Zenger case of 
1735, mentioned in the Introduction, featuring a closing argument about free 
speech that illustrates much of the intellectual boldness of the Enlightenment 
described by Pagden (and none of the flaws that troubled Becker or Gandhi).157  
Defense attorney Andrew Hamilton’s oration is a harbinger of the strength of the 
American concept of free expression, and his arguments, embodying the spirit of 
Cato’s Letters, show Enlightenment thought in action.158  The second is a speech 
by Associate Justice David H. Souter about Brown v. Board of Education, 
explaining that monumental decision as an example of “progress” made possible by 
“facing facts” about society and injustice.159 
The Zenger case centered around a colonial newspaper’s criticisms of a corrupt 
colonial governor, William Cosbie, appointed by George II to govern New York 
Colony in the early 1730s.160  From the beginning of his tenure, Cosbie had clashed 
with colonists, who resented his heavy-handed rule, his firing of a prominent judge, 
and his blatant use of office for personal financial gain.  Cosbie’s adversaries 
sought to have him recalled to London and filled the New-York Weekly Journal 
with unsigned editorial criticism and mockery.  They alleged that, under Cosbie’s 
rule, “the law itself [was] at an end” in the colony.  According to their bill of 
particulars, “We see men’s deeds destroyed, judges arbitrarily displaced, new 
courts erected without consent of the legislature by which False . . . trials by juries 
are taken away when a governor pleases, men of known estates denied their votes 
contrary to the received practice . . . .”161  In 1734, Cosbie ordered four editions of 
the paper to be burned, bypassed the grand jury in charging the newspaper’s 
printer, Zenger, with seditious libel, and jailed Zenger for months before trial.162  
The case arose some fifty years after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a pivotal 
event in which a king was forced from power and his successors made concessions 
to Parliament on issues of power and liberty.163  The Zenger case implicated a host 
of questions on the meaning of that liberty:  questions concerning the jury’s role in 
a prosecution for criticizing government and questions about the continued 
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applicability of pre-1688 English precedents in defining sedition and rejecting truth 
as a defense.  Addressing these matters, the argument of defense attorney Andrew 
Hamilton, which in written form survived the case, allows a close look at colonial-
era thinking about truth-seeking and its goal of “progress.” 
Throughout his oration, Hamilton invoked the Enlightenment idea of intellectual 
progress in various ways.  In the face of the oppressive law of seditious libel, with 
its doctrine rigged against any critic of government, with its enforcement triggered 
by government “information” rather than by grand jury indictment, and with all but 
trivial issues to be decided by judges rather than by jury, Hamilton essentially 
asked for something akin to jury nullification “in the cause of liberty.”164  His other 
arguments were equally bold, each based on an idea of progress.  Thus, he invoked 
progress that had already occurred in England—the “pulling down” of the Court of 
Star Chamber—and argued that case precedents from the Star Chamber, which 
seemed to say that truth was no defense, should no longer be followed, particularly 
not in a New York colonial courtroom.165  “I was in hopes,” he argued, “as that 
terrible Court, where those terrible judgments were given and that law established 
which [the prosecution] has produced for authorities to support this cause, was long 
ago laid aside as the most dangerous court to the liberties of the people of England 
that ever was known in that kingdom . . . .  For it is well known that what would 
have been judged treason in those days for a man to speak, I think, has since not 
only been practiced as lawful but the contrary doctrine has been held to be Law.”166  
In addition, strenuously arguing that a jury should decide Zenger’s case on all 
questions, Hamilton described the duties of a jury in much the way that 
Enlightenment writers described the broad “duties” of enlightened citizens when 
any questions of truth arose:  “[J]urymen are to see with their own eyes, to hear 
with their own ears, and to make use of their own consciences and understandings 
in judging of the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects.”167  He also 
urged a definition of power wholly consistent with the spirit of the Glorious 
Revolution, likening power to “a great river, [which] while kept within its due 
bounds, is both beautiful and useful; but when it overflows its banks, it is then too 
impetuous to be stemmed, it bears down on all before it, and brings destruction and 
desolation wherever it comes.”168  Finally, Hamilton argued that some progress that 
had already occurred with respect to freedom of religion in England—the 
allowance of open advocacy of diverse religious views—should be matched by 
respect for freedom of speech in the colonies.  He denounced what seemed to be the 
prosecution’s logic, that “in New York a man may make very free with his God, 
but he must take special care what he says of his governor.”169  Progress in 
religious freedom made no sense without accompanying progress in political 
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freedom.  Urging acquittal, Hamilton concluded by arguing that the newspaper had 
simply done what natural law and English law allowed:  “exposing and opposing 
arbitrary power False . . . by speaking and writing the truth.”170  By ending his 
oration on the word “truth,” Hamilton made it central to his argument that truthful 
adversarial response to power was both a right and a duty of citizens, and it seems 
plain that, for Hamilton, “truth” embraced both cognitive and experiential 
meanings.  He asked the jury to find that certain events had actually occurred and 
to make, in effect, a moral judgment about a specific clash between rulers and the 
ruled. 
Hamilton’s oration, then, embodied Enlightenment values connecting the search 
for truth to an idea of progress.  A modern example of such thought is Justice 
Souter’s 2012 commencement speech at Harvard University, in which he discussed 
the nature of judging in constitutional law cases, particularly in Brown v. Board of 
Education.171  Souter was responding to social critics who accuse the Supreme 
Court of activist “lawmaking” and “making up” constitutional rulings,172 in this 
instance Brown’s over-turning of Plessy v. Ferguson.173  How could “separate but 
equal” mean one thing in 1896 and something else in 1954?  Assuming that the raw 
factual differences of the two cases—railroad cars in the first, public schools in the 
second—were not significant, how could the cases come out so differently?  Souter 
argued that the answer was to be found in the cases’ highly different historical 
contexts.  In 1896, Justices on the Plessy Court could remember “the day when 
human slavery was the law in much of the land,” so that “the formal equality of an 
identical railroad car meant progress,” whereas in 1954, the Justices looked at 
“enforced segregation” and saw something that was not only different but 
intolerable:  “a judgment of inherent inferiority on the part of the minority race.”174  
Souter’s point was that the change in context had coincided with a change in 
“judicial perception” of the meaning of facts.  He added that “judicial perception 
turns on the experience of the judges and on their ability to think from a point of 
view different from their own.”175  While Souter did not elaborate on the origins of 
a change in judicial perception of the meaning of enforced segregation, his 
implication was that “experience” and the capacity to think from a different 
perspective relate to the workings of a marketplace of ideas—the discussion of 
facts and evaluations through words, speeches, articles, art, and other forms of 
communication.  In effect, Souter described a culture of argument and evaluation in 
which the meaning of social facts can change, leading to reform which some 
(although rarely all) will identify as “progress.”  In all of this, we hear echoes of 
Hamilton orating on the conditions justifying innovation in the law and on the 
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changing meaning of liberty in the British world after 1688. 
Unlike the French philosophers, Souter did not foresee a short- or long-term 
“new heaven, new earth,” nor was his theme the perfectibility of mankind.  Souter 
acknowledged living in “an indeterminate world I cannot control.”  But he echoed 
the Enlightenment spirit in saying that “it is still possible to live fully in the trust 
that a way will be found leading through the uncertain future.”  And he eloquently 
concluded, “If we cannot share every intellectual assumption that formed the minds 
of those who framed the charter, we can still address the constitutional uncertainties 
the way they must have envisioned, by relying on reason, by respecting all the 
words the Framers wrote, by facing facts, and by seeking to understand their 
meaning for living people.”176  In this sober confidence in progress sought by 
reason, we again hear Hamilton.  Most important is Souter’s emphasis on “facing 
facts,” by which he implies a commitment to truth, both “cognitive” and 
“experiential.” 
C.  TRUTH AND CHARACTER 
A third truth narrative concerns virtues associated with truth and truth-seeking in 
contemporary life.  Frankfurt suggests that a concern for truth allows for humility 
about our capacities and therefore a modicum of self-definition, based on 
“recognition that there are facts and truths over which we cannot hope to exercise 
direct or immediate control.”177  The “concept of reality” is “essentially a concept 
of what limits us, of what we cannot alter . . . by the mere movement of will.”178  
By appreciating “a world of stubbornly independent reality,” individuals “come 
both to recognize [themselves] as beings distinct from others and to articulate the 
specific nature of [their] identities.”179  Truth-seeking ironically becomes the path 
for achievement when individuals see and assess the limits of what is actually 
possible. 
Philosopher-novelist Iris Murdoch thinks that this is easier said than done.  In 
her book of essays, The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch writes, “In the moral life 
the enemy is the fat relentless ego.”180  She nods approvingly at Freud’s 
“thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature,” seeing “the psyche as an 
egocentric system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by its own 
individual history, whose natural attachments are sexual, ambiguous, and hard for 
the subject to understand or control.”181  On this view, “introspection reveals only 
the deep tissue of ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason.  
Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings.”182  Against this 
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view, moral philosophy, at least for Murdoch, “is properly . . . the discussion of this 
ego and of the techniques (if any) of its defeat.”183  Living in a “world without 
God,” Murdoch seeks a method for “reorientation of an energy that is naturally 
selfish,” and she asks, “What is a good man like?  How can we make ourselves 
morally better?  Can we make ourselves morally better?”184  Goodness for 
Murdoch relates to “truth-seeking,” in the sense of a disciplined attention to the 
“real,” or the “intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at 
the same time a suppression of self.”185  And she stresses that “the direction of 
attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self which reduces all to a false 
unity, towards the great surprising variety of the world.186  As one commentator 
explains, “Clarity of vision about the real organizes the system of psychic energy, 
thus enabling the person to choose and to act rightly.”187  Acting rightly, Murdoch 
suggests, involves an ever-deepening awareness of what is beyond the self and a 
method of decision-making flowing from that awareness.  She seems to have 
Shakespeare’s Lear in mind, in his stripped-down, revelatory experience of the 
heath, when she writes, “The more the separateness and differentness of other 
people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as 
demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing.”188  So, 
for Murdoch, the “search for truth” begins an unending process of ordering and 
clarifying the self; “it can stretch the imagination, enlarge the vision, and 
strengthen the judgment.”189 
In her account, the mind’s experience of attending to “the real” inevitably 
involves “rankings or qualitative distinctions of value,” thus measuring what is 
seen against “an implicit ideal of perfection,” which Murdoch labels the Good.190  
She sees “the moral life as a pilgrimage from appearance to reality which is guided 
by an idea of perfection and a desire for spiritual improvement or change.”191  
Thinkers proposing a naturalistic account, such as Bernard Williams, emphatically 
desert Murdoch at this point.  Williams is interested only in “human attitudes 
toward the truth” and rejects any outlook that, following Plato, “associates truth 
and goodness in ways that represent[] these things as altogether prior to a human 
interest in them.”192  Williams has no patience for Murdoch’s focus on transcendent 
goodness, her belief in “the Good” as “something inherent in a hard order of 
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reality,” or her placement of truth-seeking in such a schema.193  Williams simply 
asks, “What will she say to the claim—a pressing one, after all—that there is no 
such order of things, that what she would have us yearn for is not there?”194 
Both Frankfurt and Murdoch focus on truth’s utility for character.  Frankfurt 
stresses the role of truth-seeking in identity formation, and Murdoch ponders the 
place of truth-seeking in a moral pilgrimage.  They both conclude that truth-seeking 
fosters the virtue of humility—the seeker’s gradual sense of proportionality about 
herself and the place she realistically occupies in the world.  Williams’s book is 
ambitious in a different way:  going beyond utility, it considers whether the virtues 
of truth-seeking, which he identifies as accuracy and sincerity, can be seen as 
having intrinsic value.  The answer to this question is central to Williams’s urgent 
concern—namely, the fate of political liberalism in an age in which both 
Frankfurt’s optimism about human perception and Murdoch’s search for a 
supersensible reality may ring hollow for many people.  For Williams, the current 
age is a time of stark anxiety about truth and its necessity in the political order.195  
As noted earlier, while he sees a sharp social insistence on truthfulness, manifested 
in efforts to cut through appearances at all levels of politics and social interaction, 
Williams also finds widespread social distrust for—even contempt of—“truth” as a 
concept.196  In the face of this anxiety, Williams’s effort is to make a compelling 
argument that the virtues of truth—accuracy and sincerity—are intrinsically, and 
not simply instrumentally, important.  The argument is crucial, he thinks, for 
multiple reasons, primarily to shore up and indeed save political liberalism from the 
threat of tyranny.197  Williams’s point is straightforward:  political beliefs, 
pronouncements, and other statements purporting to be factual must answer to a 
criterion of truth, which Williams defines as the “order of things that is independent 
of us, where that means, in particular, independent of our will.”198  If that criterion 
is allowed to atrophy, and the virtues associated with it (dedication to getting things 
right and disposition not to lie) deteriorate, then the only standard left for 
evaluating assertions in society will be whatever criterion of “justification” is used 
by those in power.  Or, as one commentator puts the idea:  “The political benefit of 
the realist vocabulary of truth is that it tells us that the justificatory standards of our 
beliefs are such that they cannot be altered by the use of power.  Without this sort 
of static and unassailable model of justification we invite the possibility that power 
can bear upon which of our beliefs are true or not.  Without reality as the 
determinate of our beliefs, we invite the possibility that power and the will of 
others becomes the thing that determines them.”199  Against a backdrop of such 
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assumptions, Williams memorably concludes, “To the extent that we lose a sense 
of the value of truth, we shall certainly lose something and may well lose 
everything.”200 
So, while Frankfurt and Murdoch emphasize the virtue of humility in the moral 
life of the individual, Williams emphasizes the virtues of accuracy and sincerity in 
the political life of the state.  As a result, “Williams is concerned less with truth as a 
philosophical than as a politically salient idea.”201  Writing from the standpoint of 
naturalism, Williams insists that “everyday truths” do exist, that society has a 
strong conviction that truthfulness about non-trivial factual questions matters, and 
that, more generally, an essential project for Western thought is to “revalue” its 
virtues for a post-Enlightenment age.202  Williams therefore writes from an internal 
standpoint, and his terminology, e.g., knowledge, the virtues of truth, plain truths, 
everyday truths, facts, and so forth, “must be understood intra-culturally.”203  For 
him, “only the sphere of the physical is ontologically ultimate”; the sphere of mind 
is not, although civil society can and does reach its own situated conclusions about 
facts and values.204  The driving force of Truth and Truthfulness is Williams’s 
concern that society’s internal understanding and respect for factual truthfulness are 
at risk and must not be allowed to fade.  Williams therefore examines the function 
of truth through a vindicatory genealogy—not as a “platonically other-worldly 
idea,” but as one “in relation to very basic needs,” and then pursues its significance, 
if any, beyond mere function.205  Intellectual transformation is essential:  the values 
may collapse without their old foundations.  To create a “post moral ethic,” 
according to Williams, society must reaffirm the importance of factual truth and see 
that truthfulness applies as well to “care in arriving at moral attitudes and honesty 
in expressing such attitudes.”206 
Truth-seeking, then, can affect character in multiple ways.  Moral philosophers 
who address individual development emphasize the suppression of self that 
accompanies truth-seeking and the salutary development of humility.  Political 
theorists stress civic virtues—accuracy and sincerity—and consider their 
importance for liberal self-rule.  For all their differences, Frankfurt, Murdoch, and 
Williams share a largely unspoken appreciation of one other virtue—courage.  The 
individual’s capacity for the stamina and daring necessary to look towards a reality 
beyond the self and to make positive use of that looking-beyond, imperfect as the 
vision may be, is an assumption of their works. 
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III.  LAW AND THE TRUTH OF PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Part III examines the treatment of truth in a number of American legal decisions 
involving the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.  As mentioned 
earlier, the Supreme Court has not provided significant guidance on the truth-
seeking value, and it would be wrong to argue that a comprehensive approach 
exists.  At best, legal scholarship can suggest a way to think about existing law and 
the assumptions that appear to drive the decisions.  This Part argues that U.S. 
decisions divide analytically into three main groups, depending on whether the 
facts at issue concern the past, present, or future.  Each temporal grouping reflects 
its own view of the nature and value of the truth involved, the strength of 
competing interests, and the content of applicable legal doctrine. 
A breakdown of the cases along temporal lines is suggested not only by the 
focus of the cases themselves but also by analogy to the work of various authorities 
on truth-seeking.  Thus, as discussed earlier, Carl Becker discussed classical 
Enlightenment thought in terms of its often distinctive conceptions of past, present, 
and future.  For the figures studied by Becker, the past was an age of manipulated 
truth, illusions created or fortified by popes and kings; the present was a time of 
“simple truth” unveiled by scientists and an array of seekers from other realms of 
thought; and the future would be the occasion for further progress, even if unsteady 
or temporarily thwarted.207  Williams, too, thought in temporal terms:  the value of 
truth to an imagined community of the past, the anxiety about truth among today’s 
conflicted heirs of the Enlightenment, and the concretizing of truth as an intrinsic 
value tomorrow.208  When courts have considered truth-seeking, they too seem to 
be aided by a vocabulary of past, present, and future.  As argued here, that 
vocabulary enables courts to consider truth in usefully different facets—past truth 
as evidence of how a current social issue arose and evolved; present truth as voice 
articulating a social fact happening now; and future truth as flow of hoped-for 
information that society will need to solve its problems. 
This Part therefore examines three categories.  The first category is comprised of 
cases concerning the use of the past to shed light on the present.  The cases involve 
writings that use individual lives to illustrate social problems.  Underlying the cases 
is often a question of the “knowability” of the past:  how accurate are the accounts 
of past lives, especially when they are pressed into service to represent a social 
phenomenon?  Are there dangers of claiming too much—or understanding too 
little—about the facts of past lives?  The question is vexing, particularly when 
raised by individuals who say that they have been trivialized or misrepresented by 
such accounts, even if for a worthy cause.  But the alternative may be worse—if 
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past lives are off limits to social commentators, and the immediacy and impact of 
their narratives are lost, important discussion of social issues would surely 
deteriorate, perhaps vanish.  This Part’s discussion of a modern novel that 
addresses the issue, Paul Scott’s Staying On, deepens the analysis and suggests a 
solution. 
The second category is comprised of cases concerning truth in the present.  The 
cases involve efforts by citizens or media to ferret out information from a powerful 
entity, usually a government or a corporation, and the sought-after information 
often consists of the powerful entity’s own words.  Public exposure of this 
language is seen as an indispensable tool of democratic accountability.  The 
response of the government or corporation is to do everything possible to silence 
the citizen or journalist, and so the underlying issue is not the knowability of truth 
but its hiddenness.  This Part’s analysis includes reference to a second modern 
novel, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, which explores how the hiddenness of 
truth can affect the individual’s relation to self, others, and the world. 
The third category is comprised of cases concerning truth in the future.  These 
cases involve the workings of the common-law libel tort and statutory actions for 
false statements in various contexts.  Underlying these cases is a concern not with 
the knowability of truth or the hiddenness of truth but with its falsification.  The 
courts proceed by asking how to ensure a future flow of truthful speech overall.  In 
striking down or modifying rules based on that concern, courts ironically show a 
high tolerance for falsity.  Their theory is that protecting some false speech is 
necessary in order to facilitate a flow of communication that will include an 
acceptably high content of truthful speech overall.  Rules that condone truth’s co-
existence with significant amounts of falsity in public discourse are surely 
controversial.  A third modern novel, Ian McEwan’s Atonement, suggests a way of 
thinking about this complex alliance. 
As will be seen, the courts’ approaches in these three groupings derive from 
their perceptions of certain realities of public discourse.  The truth-seeking value 
appears to go hand-in-hand with practical, on-the-ground assessments of how 
citizens actually engage with each other in public discussion—especially 
assessments of what contributes to, or undermines, the vitality of that process.  
Seeking truth from the process requires truthfulness about what the process is, and 
battles over the realities of the process are necessarily intense. 
A.  TRUTH OF THE PAST 
Often the search for truth involves examining the past for origins or early signs 
of current social problems.  “How did we arrive at the present difficulty or crisis?” 
is a question that speakers ask about issues and then make great efforts to answer 
by looking at past events.  The question becomes urgent when a current problem is 
especially baffling and seems beyond solution.  When a speaker probes the past for 
answers, finds a set of circumstances that appears both relevant and emblematic of 
the issue in its earlier stages, and then communicates a theory based on that 
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research, legal questions can arise if the speaker’s account of past facts negatively 
portrays another person.  That person may complain of being reduced to a symbol 
or a stereotype.  The charge may be that the speaker has neglected the allegedly 
emblematic figure’s complexity as a person, or that the speaker has subordinated 
the figure to the status of victim of whatever social forces are being described.  
Challenging questions then arise about the truthfulness of the speaker’s 
presentation of the figure and of the past events in which he played a part.  The 
figure may denounce the speaker for ignoring his moral agency, while the speaker 
may insist that discussion of current problems inevitably involves creative, even 
selective, use of the past to generate solutions and inspire action.  Ultimately these 
disputes ask whether individual stories can truthfully be “representative” of the 
past. 
The law thinks they can, taking an optimistic view of the retrievability and uses 
of past truth.  Two examples of the law’s optimism are Haynes v. Alfred Knopf and 
Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.209  In each, an author addressed a troubling issue by 
using a named individual and his experience to humanize the issue and give it 
immediacy.  In Haynes, journalist Nicholas Lemann explored the twentieth-century 
migration of black families from the rural South to northern cities, focusing on the 
profound pressures caused by dislocation.  One part of his study told the story of an 
African American couple, Luther and Ruby Haynes, and the effects of migration on 
them and their children.  Ruby was Lemann’s source for many details about 
Luther’s drinking, infidelity, and corrosive conflicts with family members.  Stung 
by the book’s unflattering account of his character, Luther Haynes sued Lemann 
and the book’s publisher for invasion of privacy, arguing that the defendants’ 
public disclosure of his private facts warranted an award of damages.210  In Sidis, 
author James Thurber addressed a less prominent but still important issue:  the 
effects of a particular method of raising gifted children.  Thurber examined the life 
of William James Sidis, a prodigy whose parents had accentuated his intellectual 
gifts at the expense of other traits.  Sidis achieved remarkable academic success as 
a boy and young man, only to crash and burn as an awkward adult and retreat into 
obscurity.  When Thurber brought Sidis back into the public eye, Sidis bitterly 
objected to the story’s inclusion of intimate details—of his poor hygiene, messy 
living conditions, and various peculiarities.211  Both cases presented questions 
about past truth, particularly about the scope of a speaker’s license to characterize 
the past by drawing on personal stories and generalizing about their significance. 
As plaintiffs, both Haynes and Sidis were required to prove multiple elements 
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:  that the speaker publicized their 
private facts, that the exposure was not simply hurtful to them but would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and that the facts disclosed had no bearing on any 
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“legitimate concern” of the public.212  In cases of this kind, the challenge for 
plaintiffs is often two-fold:  to establish that the challenged facts were indeed 
private in the sense of not widely known, and that those facts had no reasonable 
nexus to a broader issue.  On both points, the Haynes court treated the case as an 
easy win for the defendants.  Writing for a federal appellate panel, Judge Richard 
Posner emphasized that the facts disclosed about Luther Haynes were not “intimate 
physical details” and thus not “private” in the requisite sense, and that the book’s 
overarching topic—the “great black migration”—had “transcendent” public 
interest.213  On the latter point, Judge Posner found that the account of Luther 
Haynes’s behavior was clearly connected to the book’s main theme:  that the ordeal 
experienced by migrant African Americans stemmed from the collision of 
misguided government policies with “a sharecropper morality” characterized by a 
certain family structure—“matriarchal and elastic”—and an “extremely unstable 
marriage bond.”214  Judge Posner had no problem describing Luther Haynes as a 
“representative figure” of this personal profile.  Although Judge Posner said that a 
composite portrait of migrating blacks would be “racial stereotyping,” the approach 
used in the book—providing a case history of one person as a “representative 
figure”—presented for the court no such problem.215 
The court in Haynes granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
noting that the “public need[ed]” the book’s information about Haynes.216  But 
even if the case’s outcome was correct, its treatment of Luther Haynes and indeed 
its conception of history were surely problematic.  At the very least, the court was 
too quick to accept the assertion that Luther Haynes “represented” black experience 
in the sense of embodying the “sharecropper morality” and falling prey to 
governmental policies that exacerbated that morality’s effects.  Even if the book did 
avoid racial stereotyping, did it not come close to the same thing in casting Haynes 
as illustrative of a thesis about black experience?  It is not hard to imagine Haynes 
arguing that the book had denied his own moral agency, stereotyping him as “a 
passive victim of impersonal forces.”217  Moreover, Lemann’s approach—using 
individuals as historical types—carried the risk of simplifying history.  Is the past 
adequately captured by the presentation of a “representative” man?  The court’s 
failure to acknowledge these arguments perhaps signaled a sense that, even if they 
had merit, no practical alternative to Lemann’s use of the past was available.  The 
court may have seen the use of Haynes’s private facts as an inescapable cost of 
addressing current issues by searching for insights, however limited or partial, in 
past lives.  From what other sources could solutions come? 
Whereas there was no question in Haynes that the book addressed an 
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overarching theme of public importance, the Sidis court examined whether any 
such issue was involved in the first place.  Unlike Lemann’s book, Thurber’s article 
about the prodigy did not explicitly claim any larger purpose than to tell a “where 
are they now” story.218  Seeing no high-minded theme, the prodigy-plaintiff argued 
that the article’s “vicious” cataloguing of “sordid and purely personal items” had 
been written in a “sly and sarcastic” tone that pointed to “selfish commercial 
interests” as its sole motivation.219  At oral argument, the magazine’s attorney 
insisted that the article had an implicit theme of legitimate public interest—that 
Sidis’s eccentric life was a “tragic illustration of the havoc caused by the ruthless 
parental exploitation of gifted children.”220  Thurber himself reinforced this point in 
a later memoir, writing that his purpose had been to “help curb the great American 
thrusting of talented children into the glare of fame or notoriety, a procedure in so 
many cases disastrous to the later career and happiness of the exploited 
youngsters.”221  In effect, Thurber made the same type of claim that Lemann made 
in Haynes:  that an individual’s life could be seen as “representative” of an 
important issue and, as a result, should be protected from liability. 
Writing for a federal appellate panel, Judge Charles Clarke accepted that the 
article dealt with a matter of public concern, but did not frame the matter in the 
same way as Thurber and his attorney.222  Perhaps less certain than Judge Posner 
that a “case history” could be readily labeled as “representative” of past historical 
circumstances, Judge Clarke may have seen that ratifying Thurber’s 
characterization of the larger issue would have required the court to address 
whether Sidis’s life was in fact an illustration of the issue.  Could it be said with 
any degree of certainty that Sidis’s adult behavior was solely—or even largely—a 
product of being “thrust into the glare of fame and notoriety” as a child by 
misguided parents?  Judge Clarke and his fellow judges may have doubted their 
ability to answer that question.  They may also have doubted the underlying notion 
that the trajectory of an individual’s life can be reduced to one major cause.  Sidis 
himself was adamant that The New Yorker profile—far from “essaying 
information”—had not told his whole story, but had emphasized only the facts that 
supported a mocking portrait.223 
Perhaps resistant to viewing Sidis as a symbol, yet recognizing the value of 
articles such as Thurber’s, the panel chose a more modest characterization of the 
matter of public concern:  whether the prodigy had “fulfilled his early promise.”224  
Stating the overarching issue this way allowed the panel to focus on Sidis as a 
person, rather than an emblem of lifelong victimization caused by a misdirected 
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childhood.  The court steered clear of any suggestion that Sidis was 
“representative” of anything but his own life.  With a more modest statement of the 
article’s concern, it was not difficult for the court to trace a linkage between that 
issue and the article, and to regard the article’s implicit answer—that no, Sidis had 
not fulfilled his promise—as either a protected opinion or a factual statement 
unlikely to be contested.  Much more than the opinion in Haynes, the Sidis opinion 
seemed aware of the risk of public issue writing:  that it often depends on 
illustrations provided by the lives of real people but that the illustrations, properly 
understood, should not purport to capture the whole truth of a human life. 
Unfortunately, the analysis in Sidis was curt, and the court’s reasons for 
reframing the larger issue were not spelled out.  This leaves us with only hints 
about its approach to past truth and its uses.  What can be gained from facts of the 
past besides the facts themselves?  Can historical individual stories plausibly tell 
larger truths?  The fact that the courts in Haynes and Sidis take such different roads 
to the same conclusion—that the lawsuit must fail—suggests the need for further 
reflection about the availability of past facts to establish something meaningful 
about current conditions. 
This question is at the heart of a Booker Prize-winning novel, Staying On, by 
British author Paul Scott.225  The novel was published towards the end of Scott’s 
life, a coda to his more famous work, The Raj Quartet (a sequence of novels set in 
India in the last years before Indian independence).226  The Raj Quartet is 
considered “among the greatest prose fictions” of modernist literature.227  In these 
novels, Scott recounts the interlocking stories of various British and Indian 
characters in the waning days of British colonial rule.  His theme is that the moral 
“promise” of friendship and respect originally made by England to India had not 
been kept, and that commercial and political self-interest, fueled by racism, had led 
to incalculable human damage.228  As the Quartet draws to an end in the 
independence celebrations of 1947, most of the English characters book passage for 
uncertain futures in England.  Two minor characters, Tusker and Lucy Smalley, 
plan to remain in India, and in Staying On, the Smalleys assume center stage.  A 
compelling blend of comedy and pathos, the novel depicts their situation twenty-
five years after independence, their compatriots and the trappings of privileged life 
long ago dispatched.  Now in their old age, the Smalleys rely heavily on Indian 
employees for daily needs as their Indian landlady schemes with a corporate 
developer to sell the childless couple’s lodgings and turn them out.  Lucy, lonely 
and isolated, is convinced that their lives have been wasted, while Tusker masks his 
similar intuitions in gruff talk and occasional heavy drinking.229 
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The novel’s central concern, revealed gradually by Scott, is the fragility of truth, 
thought of in at least two different ways.  The first concerns the human need to 
disguise the truth.  Scott pursues this theme in largely comic fashion.  The Smalleys 
realize that their financially ruthless landlady has quietly changed a term of their 
lease without making the change clear to them:  the revised agreement omits the 
landlady’s long-time duty to tend the Smalleys’s small yard and maintain their 
garden.230  Besides invoking the biblical image of a lost garden, Scott artfully 
shows in miniature how English and Indian roles have changed in post-Raj India:  
whereas the former relationship between the two countries involved a moral 
promise—that English colonial rulers gave lip service to but completely failed to 
honor—the “new” relationship is governed by coldly legal arrangements like the 
lease.  Contract law replaces moral responsibilities, and linguistic cleverness gives 
the upper hand to now powerful Indians.  Aware that the change in terms will 
enrage Tusker, and perhaps make him ill, Lucy plans an elaborate “deception.”231  
Without telling Tusker, she hires a boy to care for the grass and garden and makes 
the arrangement appear as if the landlady provides it.  Lucy’s goal is to spare 
Tusker the humiliation of finding himself openly exploited.  Scott’s little story 
works on several levels.  First, it conveys how deception is needed to make life 
bearable for the British who have stayed on, even twenty-five years after the 
collapse of the Raj.  Scott’s point here is similar to the point of George Orwell’s 
famous essay, Shooting the Elephant.  In the essay, Orwell describes how 
dishonesty seeped into all dimensions of life when the British were still in charge 
of India.232  It seems, then, that the Smalleys “illustrate” British mendacity, at least 
in an ironic sense.  Lucy’s deceptions echo the Raj’s own methods of coping 
through deceit.  On a second level, both Scott and Orwell suggest that the deception 
permeating colonial and post-colonial rule is a metaphor for the deception that 
permeates human relations generally, poisoning relationships at the same time that 
it makes them possible.  The Smalleys seem to “illustrate” this point as well. 
Scott is more interested in a second theme related to truth.  The Smalleys are 
aware that they are occasionally presented to tourists who ask whether there are 
“any old-style British around here.”233  The Smalleys themselves have joked about 
being placed on “the tourist itinerary” as a “tableau vivant” of remnants of the 
Raj.234  That prospect seems less amusing when Lucy Smalley learns that a young 
historian from Cambridge will be arriving in India.  The historian, Mr. Turner, 
hopes to meet the couple, hear about their post-Raj experiences, and possibly write 
about them.  Lucy worries that, although Turner could turn out to be “a sympathetic 
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listener,” he might just as likely “laugh[] at us like a drain.”235  Worse, even if 
Turner merely “want[s] to know what it has been like” for the Smalleys to live in 
India after independence, Lucy knows that “it has not been like anything because it 
has been different for everybody, just as it has been different for me and different 
again for Tusker.”236  Lucy’s concerns are thus two-fold:  first, that treating a 
person as representative of a public matter reduces the person’s complexity and, 
ultimately, his humanity—as Thurber arguably did in making Sidis a stand-in for 
gifted children thrust into notoriety by their parents; and second, that claiming that 
one person’s experience can illustrate the experience of others is simply false, 
because people with diverse origins, temperaments, and past experience encounter 
the same conditions in vastly different ways.  In this respect, the truth of a person’s 
moral experience is both impossible to know and meaningless to use to characterize 
a larger group. 
Despite all this, Lucy has a sense of inevitability that, no matter what, the 
historian will judge the Smalleys and attribute some kind of symbolic significance 
to them.  As she awaits his arrival, she begins a series of mental conversations with 
him, in effect seeking a fair hearing and offering her testimony.237  In her mind, 
Lucy defends and grapples with the Smalleys’s history.  These recollections 
suggest that she could never be a mere symbol.  Far from being representative of 
the prejudices and delusions of the Raj, Lucy is revealed to have detested British 
class-consciousness and longed to relocate to a part of India that was remote from 
the main action of the Raj.238  Her recollections of Tusker’s failure to advance in 
his military career and the resulting impact on their social position invariably end 
not in answers but questions that become increasingly clear-eyed about her own 
aspirations and failings. 
Lucy then poses some of these questions to Tusker, realizing that he may die 
soon.  Tusker is thereby forced into recollections of his own.  It turns out that he 
too was far from a partisan of the Raj.  A functionary who, unknown to Lucy, 
chafed at the absurdities of the military class, Tusker had deliberately avoided 
opportunities to advance.  His memories are telling:  “[I] invested in India, not 
money which I’ve never had, not talent (Ha!) which I’ve only had a limited amount 
of, nothing India needed or needs or has been one jot the better for, but was all I 
had to invest in anything.  Me.”239  These reflections lead to an effort by Tusker to 
communicate on a more loving, personal level with Lucy.  But he cannot answer 
everything she has asked, and his death leaves her with further questions.  The 
novel wholly dissuades the reader from seeing Lucy and Tusker as illustrations of 
issues or groups.  Rather, each is a solitary consciousness.240  Saddled with layered 
backgrounds, the Smalleys struggle towards a sense of purpose within an 
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oppressive milieu.  They connect with each other and those around them only 
fitfully, yet they manage in the end to see themselves honestly through the odd 
clarity of questions. 
Scott thus challenges the confidence of a decision like Haynes, where the court 
suggested that an author can readily summarize an era or social group by 
excavating the story of one person or one couple.  For Scott, truth telling is a 
different activity altogether, a chronicle of lives for their own significance.  As 
Staying On ends, Lucy is widowed, grieving, and afraid of isolation, but she 
resolves to keep her appointment with the historian.241  She understands that Mr. 
Turner will never be able to tell the couple’s full story or to resist remaking them as 
symbols, but she bargains that something accurate and useful might indeed be 
salvaged:  not a depiction of the Smalleys as “representative,” but an account of 
two individuals whose own idiosyncratic lives revealed them as part of—yet at the 
same time not part of—the foreign ruling class in India.  Even this account would 
be incomplete, but it would be an example of “practical realism.”  As historian 
Gordon Wood has written, practical realism “recognizes that there cannot be an 
exact correspondence between words and what is out there,” yet “continues to aim 
for as much accuracy and completeness as possible in the historical reconstruction 
of the past.  Our interpretations of the past may be imperfect, but practical realism 
knows that some words and conventions, however socially constructed, reach out to 
a world and give a reasonably true description of its contents.”242 
To take the modest approach of the Sidis court and say that the partial account 
accurately provides one aspect of the British experience in India—that some small 
number of the British were more comfortable with Indian society than with their 
own, and therefore remained after independence—would be consistent with 
Wood’s understanding of “practical realism.”  As for Scott, it is likely that he 
regarded the Smalleys as “representative” only in an ironic sense:  they reflected 
not historical types but humanity itself.  Their experience of love, isolation, and 
bafflement is central to his story, and Lucy’s last thoughts are framed as questions, 
probing the nature of human longing.243 
B.  TRUTH OF THE PRESENT 
The previous section discussed complications from using lives as illustrations to 
salvage truth of the past.  We turn now to a set of cases involving present truth.  
Here, speakers addressing public issues do not use illustrative speech; instead, their 
method is to publicize the words of another person, office, or entity in order to 
expose some untoward aspect of power or privilege.  In these cases, parties on the 
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verge of exposure, or who have been exposed and seek to discourage further 
attention, use the legal system in an effort to silence the speaker.  Sometimes they 
seek injunctions, sometimes they seek the closure of a courtroom or another site of 
decision-making, and sometimes they use legal devices with obvious intimidating 
effect.  As discussed in this section, courts have developed strong legal doctrine in 
order to discourage these silencing attempts.  In many instances, the doctrine is 
sufficient to allow speakers to impeach the powerful through their own words.  The 
assumption is that application of this potent anti-silencing doctrine will yield 
immediate benefits.  Yet courts rarely pause to reflect on what those benefits are 
and what else may be needed for them to materialize.  Moreover, courts too seldom 
link the doctrine to truth-seeking and thus miss an opportunity to inquire further 
about the underlying goals of the First Amendment. 
Prior Restraint.  The clearest cases involving “present truth” involve prior 
restraint.  While prior restraint doctrine does not differentiate between true and 
false speech—it protects both from advance suppression—certain social players try 
to use the law’s tolerance for prior restraint in exceptional situations as a tactic to 
suppress truthful speech. 244  Thus, in a number of well known cases of prior 
restraint, the purpose of the party seeking the restraint was to silence truthful 
reporting.  Moreover, the content of that truthful reporting was the party’s own 
words. 
For example, in New York Times Co. v. United States, the Times sought to 
publish classified government speech.245  The documents included excerpts from a 
previously unreported archive of the Defense Department on the American build-
up in Vietnam from the late 1940s through the end of the 1960s (“the Papers”).246  
In the earliest stages of planning the archive, Defense Secretary McNamara had 
focused on truth-telling:  fearful that primary documents would be lost, he wanted 
to preserve a record for posterity and create an “encyclopedic and objective” 
account of how U.S. war efforts began, gradually escalated, faltered, and were 
almost certain to fail.247  The material that the government sought to suppress was 
thus true in the sense of being the actual content of the archive, and it was “present” 
in the sense that the war was ongoing, hundreds of thousands of troops were 
achieving inconclusive results, and domestic dissent was widespread.  In their 
watchdog roles, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers 
wanted to bring this archive to public attention in large part because its contents 
were, in many instances, completely at odds with contemporaneous official claims, 
confirming suspicions that the government had lied before and was probably still 
lying about prospects for success.248  As Floyd Abrams has written, “The 
documents were devastating, demonstrating an extraordinary level of governmental 
duplicity, based on an unprecedented source—the very files of the Government 
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itself.”249  The Post, for example, was able to show that, although McNamara had 
told the press at a particular news conference in 1963 that he and President Johnson 
had just reviewed war operations and were confident of success, the documents 
showed that McNamara in fact had given the President a very pessimistic appraisal 
that very day.  “What might have happened,” asked a Post editor after the Papers 
were published, “had the truth emerged in 1963 instead of 1971” about 
McNamara’s real misgivings and about what he had said to the President?250 
Tormented about the war’s hopeless direction, McNamara ordered assemblage 
of the archive in 1967, saying, “Let the chips fall where they may.”251  He thus 
acknowledged that at some undetermined time, the documents’ truth would become 
public knowledge.  Yet, with little certainty about what, if any, danger their 
publication would cause, the U.S. audaciously sought to silence the Times—and 
thus keep the government’s own thinking hidden—by obtaining a restraining order 
against publication.  The litigation consisted of an astonishing two-week marathon 
from Foley Square to the Supreme Court over questions about what the Pentagon 
Papers revealed and about whether their publication would lead to the deaths of 
soldiers or the breakdown of peace talks.  The government could establish 
neither.252  When the smoke cleared and the Supreme Court struck down the 
injunctions, a commentator said that the saga “signaled the passing of a period 
when newspapers could be expected to play by tacit rules in treating matters that 
Government leaders deem confidential.”253  The truth-seeking process was shown 
to have hitherto unexplored dimensions:  it was one thing for a newspaper to report 
what a source had revealed about government behavior, but another thing for a 
newspaper to unveil official misrepresentation—especially about the prosecution of 
a war—by exposing the government’s own hidden speech. 
Private entities have attempted a similar kind of silencing.  In 1997, a corporate 
defendant in a federal lawsuit sought to suppress reporting based on sealed 
documents in the lawsuit.254  Procter & Gamble had sued Bankers Trust, alleging 
fraud in selling derivatives, which one judge in the case called “a particularly 
newsworthy investment these days.”255  P&G claimed losses in excess of $100 
million.256  The parties agreed to a protective order allowing them remarkably free 
rein to seal documents from public inspection.257  When BusinessWeek obtained the 
latest round of documents without violating any law or order, including a 300-page 
amended complaint, the magazine prepared a story about the contents of the new 
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filings.  It was thought that the allegations would spark considerable interest among 
other companies and shareholders.258  However, P&G and Bankers Trust demanded 
that the protective order take priority and persuaded a federal judge to fax a 
restraining order to the magazine, completely without benefit of First Amendment 
argument.259  The judge later defended his action by likening BusinessWeek’s 
lawful receipt of the litigation materials to “absconding with sealed documents 
from a courthouse.”260  In the end, a federal appellate panel held that “the private 
litigants’ interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply 
does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint.”261 
Closure and Sealing Orders.  Because prior restraint is rarely successful, 
powerful entities have tried other methods of blocking truthful coverage of current 
governmental actions.  A compelling recent example comes from Delaware.  In 
2009, state legislators enacted “private arbitration” legislation in an effort to remain 
“a magnet for corporate litigation.”262  Pursuant to the statute, Delaware Chancery 
Court judges, already noted for their expertise and adjudicative efficiency, were 
authorized to arbitrate certain business disputes in courtrooms that would be closed 
to the press and public.  Calling the plan an “interesting experiment,” one 
commentator suggested that confidentiality was a key attraction of the plan:  “[A 
lot] of people do business together and may not want their dirty linen in public, so 
to speak.”263  The plan’s rules were clear:  eligible disputes would be those 
involving at least $1 million; litigants would agree to pay $12,000 in filing fees and 
$6000 per day of arbitration; at least one party would be a business entity formed or 
organized in Delaware; and neither party would be a consumer.264  Press coverage 
of the handful of arbitrations that took place after the statute passed pointedly 
mentioned that the ban on attendees included shareholders.265 
A citizens’ group challenged the statute in Delaware Coalition for Open 
Government v. Strine, arguing that the press and public had a qualified First 
Amendment right of access to state-sponsored arbitrations.266  Obvious questions 
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affecting the public had been removed from the public eye:  the nature of corporate 
conduct at issue in a given proceeding, implications for investors, the rulings and 
outcomes reached by Chancery judges, and the likely significance.  A federal 
district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, and a split panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.267  Unfortunately, this 
challenge produced multiple judicial views about the applicable First Amendment 
framework and rationale.  The lack of clear guidelines may embolden other efforts 
to close courtrooms in contexts not identical to this one. 
Besides closing courtrooms, courts have used sealing orders that have the effect 
of restricting truthful reporting.  In a recent civil case brought by a corporation 
against the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the plaintiff, a manufacturer, 
convinced a federal judge to conduct much of the litigation “behind closed 
doors.”268  The plaintiff sought to block the agency from posting on its public 
database a consumer’s report that the plaintiff’s product had injured a child.  
Because the statute authorized manufacturers to object to postings containing 
inaccurate or confidential information, the plaintiff had opposed the posting and 
sued when all of its objections were not met.269  The plaintiff insisted that possible 
harm to its reputation justified its litigating under seal and proceeding under a 
pseudonym.  Despite the protests of a citizens group, the trial judge agreed, 
labeling as “abstract” the interest in public access to litigation and ordering 
permanent sealing of numerous documents.270  A federal appellate panel later 
reversed, although a concurrence cast at least some doubt on the vigor of the First 
Amendment ruling.271 
Intimidation.  Another silencing tactic is sheer intimidation, whether carried out 
by government or a private entity.  Again, the cases feature attempts to silence 
those who seek to publicize the words and conduct of a government unit or private 
entity.  In Bridges v. Gilbert, a state inmate, Bridges, provided an affidavit and 
agreed to testify in a wrongful death suit about what he heard prison employees say 
in an adjacent prison cell on the night a fellow prisoner died.272  After providing the 
affidavit, Bridges began to believe that prison employees were retaliating against 
him for his testimony.  In the inmate’s own suit against the prison and various 
employees, the issue was whether Bridges’s testimony qualified for First 
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Amendment protection.273  To answer the question, a federal appellate panel 
examined whether the First Amendment required that the speech be of “public 
concern” or whether the speech need only be “reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”274  The panel chose the latter test, ruling that “truthful 
speech that describes possible abuses” is “consistent with legitimate penological 
objectives” and thus receives constitutional protection.275  By adopting this test 
instead of the more demanding “public interest” standard, the panel in effect 
invoked the truth-seeking value of the First Amendment in a context where 
speakers are “shut off from the outside world” and have few if any options to hold 
government power accountable.276  In this case, one of those options was the right 
to unveil present truth in the sense of repeating the very words of power. 
Non-governmental entities have other means to intimidate speakers seeking to 
expose the entities’ language and behavior.  A device that has been linked to 
potential intimidation is pre-service discovery to identify a John Doe critic on the 
Internet.  In Dendrite International v. Doe, No.3, a corporate plaintiff sought to 
learn the identity of an anonymous critic who had posted quotations from the 
corporation’s earnings report, along with disparaging comments, on a website’s 
message board.277  The publicly traded company, Dendrite International, decided to 
sue the anonymous blogger and moved a state court for an order directing the 
website to identify the blogger.278  On these facts, the court saw its task as 
developing a framework that would sensitively balance the John Doe critic’s 
qualified First Amendment right to speak anonymously and the corporation’s 
interest in suing to vindicate its reputation.279  The goal, said the court, was a 
framework that would prevent use of pre-service discovery “to harass or 
intimidate” speakers.280  It noted that Internet users “should be able to participate 
online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them can file a 
frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court’s order to discover their 
identity.”281  On this reasoning, the court rejected the more lenient test for 
unmasking John Doe.  Because the threat of unmasking could chill “John Doe” 
bloggers in the first place, the court chose a multi-prong test that was designed to 
err on the side of protecting speech. 
The point is not that all silencing efforts should be forbidden by the First 
Amendment on the ground of truth.  The truth-seeking value has never claimed that 
First Amendment protection must be absolute.  Rather, the point is that, even today, 
powerful entities seek on occasion to block truthful communication, and that an 
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implicit consideration in making and applying legal doctrine has been that the 
content sought to be blocked is truthful information—often, hidden words of the 
powerful.  Another implicit premise of the cases is that a process is at work:  the 
transmission of protected information to recipients for whom it is of legitimate 
interest or even of vital importance.  The ideal of a speech process is that recipients 
use the information they receive to further their conceptions of the best interests of 
society.  On this view, the negative liberty afforded by First Amendment doctrine 
enables information to reach citizens, who, in discussing, reflecting upon, and 
otherwise following-up on the information, have the option of exercising positive 
liberty—the freedom to act for the good of society as they conceive it.282 
But this idea of a speech process for the transmission and use of truthful 
information is still too abstract to capture the possible depths of the truth-seeking 
value and its connection to present truth.  Bernard Williams offers a clue in Truth 
and Truthfulness.283  In a discussion of Orwell’s 1984, Williams examines the 
depiction of relentless state torture used to force the protagonist, Winston Smith, 
not only to say but also to believe that two plus two equals five.  Williams takes 
strong issue with Richard Rorty’s interpretation of this scene.284  Rorty had argued 
that Orwells’s ethical and political point had nothing to do with truth or falsity but 
was to criticize the state for impeding the protagonist’s right to say what he 
believes (that two plus two equals four).285  According to Williams’s quite different 
interpretation, Orwell’s point was precisely about truth and falsity—that the ethical 
and political evil was both the state’s prevention of speech, but more deeply, the 
state’s destruction of “the victim’s relation to the world altogether, undoing the 
distinctions between fantasy and reality.”286  For Williams, the state power asserted 
in 1984 was an assault on Winston’s “sense of reality and capacity for true belief,” 
a point that Rorty had failed to understand or acknowledge.287  The cases involving 
present truth are connected by a theme of power—whether used by state or private 
entity—to keep information out of the public’s reach.  Perhaps the cases do not 
involve acts of power as audacious or violent as that imagined by Orwell, but the 
strong doctrines developed by courts display a wariness of power all the same, 
particularly its ability to come between the individual and his “world.” 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, Never Let Me Go, deepens the latter theme. 288  Telling 
a story of a speech process and its effects, the novel posits that the ultimate 
objective of the process is relational in the sense of producing a particular kind of 
link between the person and his or her social context.  Ishiguro imagines a society 
like ours with one key difference:  through scientific advances, human cloning has 
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been made possible.  The purpose of cloning is to further the health of the general 
population by creating a stable supply of human organs for transplantation.  In 
tracing the lives of three clones from childhood through early adulthood, Ishiguro 
raises questions about the social responsibilities of creating a sub-class of human 
beings.289  As in his other novels, Ishiguro’s intentions are “metaphorical” as well:  
recounting the story of his central characters allows him to reflect on questions and 
conditions that burden all of human life.290  Part of the metaphorical story concerns 
the search for truth undertaken by Kathy H., the narrator, and her friend, Tommy. 
The early chapters are devoted to the mostly idyllic childhoods of the clones at 
Hailsham, an English boarding school located in the countryside, complete with 
playing fields, a duck pond, and kindly teachers.  The clones have a normal 
education, but they grow up as orphans isolated from society.  Although the school 
tells them that they are clones and will eventually “donate” parts of their bodies, the 
school delivers the information in dribs and drabs, mixed with other information to 
reduce its impact, and delivered when the clones are too young to fully grasp what 
is being said.  As one of their teachers fumes, “You’ve been told and not told.”291  
Against this backdrop of limited knowledge and incomplete understanding, the 
clones grow up with only a few, including Kathy H., bold enough to detect clues, 
ponder their meaning, ask questions, and discuss the mysteries of their lives.  
Hailsham closes when its mission of providing a normal education for clones falls 
out of political favor in England.292  Cut off from this physical connection to her 
secure childhood, Kathy continues in her twenties to search for an accurate 
understanding of her existence and fate. 
As in the India of Staying On, an underlying air of deception permeates Kathy’s 
friendships and surroundings, but she and Tommy are closely linked from the start.  
Out of the murkiness of their education, a rumor circulates that if two of the clones 
fell truly in love, they could obtain a “deferral” from the duty to donate and thus 
exemption from death in early adulthood.293  It becomes the mission of Kathy and 
Tommy to discover whether this rumor has any truth and thus whether they could 
somehow escape their fates.  Their seeking leads them to the home of Emily, the 
one-time headmistress of Hailsham, who may hold the answer to many of the 
questions that filled their young lives, including the rumor of deferrals.  Kathy’s 
calm insistence that Emily answer questions resembles the pressings of citizen 
groups for access to the information withheld by governments or corporations.  
Like Winston Smith and like the citizen groups of First Amendment access cases, 
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Kathy’s quest for truth is part of a larger quest for freedom:  are the clones truly 
subject to the demands of the donation program, or do they have another option?  
Kathy and Tommy doggedly pursue any possibility of reprieve. 
Emily, whose liberal values informed her leadership of Hailsham, answers 
Kathy’s questions, but her values turn out to be surprisingly shallow.  Although 
Emily sympathizes with her former students—even more so now in a political 
environment that has lost its former compassion for clones—she maintains her 
reserve.294  In the scene in which she agrees to meet with Kathy and Tommy, she 
simultaneously supervises the removal of valuable furniture from her home.  
Juxtaposing furniture and clones, Ishiguro suggests that even an ally sees Kathy 
and Tommy as objects—valuable, but not quite human.  Nevertheless, Emily 
respects them enough to answer their questions:  deferrals are not available; and the 
rumor—that love can earn them an exemption—is baseless.  Of course, the 
literalistic Emily never sees Ishiguro’s larger irony—that the rumor is true:  the 
loving relationship between Kathy and Tommy has enabled them to cheat, at least 
in a figurative sense and if only temporarily, the fate that society’s indifference has 
assigned them. 
But the novel does not end with the release of sought-after facts from a former 
teacher.  Like Bernard Williams, Ishiguro is interested in the effects of a speech 
dynamic.  What happens next—after the petitioning and forcing of power to 
provide crucial information?  What is the effect of receiving information that a 
speech process at least sometimes makes available?  In the last twenty pages of the 
novel, Ishiguro shows that, with their futures grimly clarified and the illusion of 
deferrals erased, Kathy and Tommy enter into different relationships with 
themselves, each other, and the world they inhabit.  The information first provides 
a basis for greater self-knowledge.  For Tommy, the background history provided 
by Emily about Hailsham confirms the sense he had had since early childhood that 
the school was withholding crucial facts and that its lack of candor was wrong.295  
Tommy’s tantrums as a child turn out to have been prescient, and this realization 
seems to increase his present self-respect.  For Kathy, the information obtained 
from Emily provides the stamina to do what she has most deeply resisted—letting 
go of Tommy as he prepares for his fourth “donation,” which will undoubtedly be 
fatal.296  Following these separate experiences of growth, Kathy and Tommy find a 
new honesty in their relationship:  it is less dependent on their nostalgia for 
childhood and Hailsham, and more cognizant and expressive of the mature love 
between them.  Their conversations and silences reach a quiet depth of 
understanding.297  Finally, the connection of each to the world is clarified.  Tommy 
is able to confront the prospect of his impending death with unexpected resolve, 
and Kathy achieves the “ordering of her thoughts” that prompted her narration in 
the first place.  Their final conversation concerns whether or not it was better that 
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they finally learned the facts, unlike their Hailsham friends who had already died.  
On this question, Tommy considers the difference between questioners and 
believers.  “You and me,” he says to Kathy, “right from the start, even when we 
were little, we were always trying to find things out,” whereas their friends among 
the clones “always wanted to believe in things.”298  For truth seekers, they 
conclude, it is better to know, even if the knowledge is far from what they hoped it 
would be. 
Ishiguro’s implication is that the truth-seeking dynamic has allowed these 
characters a relationship with each other and with the world that they would 
otherwise not have had.  Of course, the relationship has come too late, because the 
truth in its particulars was deferred.  Perhaps in Ishiguro’s seekers we hear an echo 
of the editor’s question after publication of the Pentagon Papers:  “What might 
have happened, had the truth emerged in 1963 instead of 1971?”299 
C.  TRUTH OF THE FUTURE 
So far, this Article has shown that cases involving “past truth” essentially ask, 
“What reality of the past can be salvaged and used to deal with a current issue?”  
The answer, it turns out, is:  “Not much, but some.”  In turn, cases involving 
“present truth” ask, “What is actually happening right now?” and the answer seems 
to be, “Start with the words of those in charge.”  Now, for cases involving “future 
truth,” the question is:  “What is coming tomorrow, and how much untruth needs to 
be cleared away (and by whom) in order to see it?”  The set of cases in this third 
category are explicitly concerned with devising legal doctrine that will promote a 
flow of truthful speech beyond today.  As such, the cases speculate on cause and 
effect, positing that certain rules will be more likely than others to produce an 
acceptable flow of truthful expression about public matters, broadly defined.  The 
cases in this category include common-law actions for libel and statutory actions 
for false speech about political issues or other subject matter that the legislature 
seeks to regulate.  Through the libel tort and the statutory causes of action, the 
government itself seeks to promote truthful speech and associated goals:  protection 
of reputation, furtherance of the integrity of the judicial process, and so forth.  A 
striking aspect of these cases is the judiciary’s insistence that the First Amendment 
requires a different approach to promoting truth and the other goals.  That approach 
involves a high tolerance for falsity.  How is this tolerance consistent with the 
truth-seeking value?  As discussed below, rules that tolerate at least some false 
speech are seen as contributing to an overall flow of truthful speech.  The scope of 
this tolerance is controversial, as the cases pit the constitutional truth-seeking value 
against a common-law or statutory strategy for promoting truth by regulation.  This 
section closes out with a discussion of a third novel, Atonement, which adds to an 
appreciation of the complexity of truth’s tangled connection to falsity. 
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the classic and still vital First Amendment case 
that recently marked its fiftieth anniversary, seems at first blush to be driven not by 
the truth-seeking value but by the self-governance value of the First Amendment.300  
The case famously held that the common-law action for libel, with its structure of 
strict liability and presumed damage, was constitutionally infirm when used by a 
public official against a “citizen critic of government.”301  Writing for the Supreme 
Court, Justice Brennan prefaced the analysis by citing Justice Brandeis’s 
observation that “[t]hose who won our independence believed . . . that public 
discussion is a public duty,” and invoking the nation’s commitment that “debate on 
public issues [be] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”302  In addition, Justice 
Brennan twice quoted James Madison’s statement that the “censorial power is in 
the people over the Government, and not the Government over the people,” and he 
analogized the lawsuit in Sullivan to the Adams administration’s use of the Sedition 
Act of 1798 to punish the speech of political rivals.303 
However, despite the linkage of expressive freedoms to an underlying value of 
self-governance, Justice Brennan’s reflections on the “censorial power” pointed to 
an even deeper concern:  the need to protect at least some false speech in order to 
discourage self-censorship and thus promote a generous flow of truthful public 
discourse over the long haul.  The truth-seeking value was thus arguably the core of 
Justice Brennan’s concern.  His opinion for the Court addressed this concern by 
looking ahead, imagining the needs and benefits of the free-speech tradition in an 
ever complicating age.  Examining the reality of public discourse in this country, he 
accepted its awkwardly robust combination of passion and reason, and twice noted 
the inevitability of false statements in the heat of “free debate.”304  The obvious 
question, then, was whether the harshness of the existing libel tort in the context of 
“inevitable” falsity would deter citizen-critics from speaking out on public matters 
in the first place. The answer was clearly “yes”:  if Commissioner Sullivan 
succeeded in wresting $500,000 from the New York Times for publishing erroneous 
facts, imitative suits would jeopardize reporting of public events not only in the 
South but throughout the nation.305  Justice Brennan probed the likely impact of 
such verdicts and, again projecting forward, concluded that the main casualty 
would be true information.  Even though truth was a defense in libel actions (and 
thus a defense embodying the common-law’s own truth-seeking value), its 
constitutional adequacy was questionable at best.  A potential citizen-critic could 
have real reason to doubt his ability to prove truth in a courtroom, even if the 
content of his speech were in fact true and he honestly believed it to be so.306  On 
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this reasoning, Justice Brennan showed that his primary concern in Sullivan was the 
tort’s chilling effect on truthful information about public issues—in his words, “the 
pall of fear and timidity” on would-be speakers who would choose silence over the 
risk of liability.307  Weighing these considerations against the reputational interest 
of public-official plaintiffs, the Sullivan Court decided that the Constitution 
required the addition of two elements—falsity and fault—to a public official’s 
prima facie case.308  The new rule would protect falsity about public officials, but 
its protection would not be absolute—there would be no safe haven for the 
calculated lie or a reckless untruth.309  The Court thus established a margin of error 
that it thought would facilitate a vital flow of truthful discourse, trusting that, over 
time, public discourse in all its diversity would lead to informed decisions by the 
public and its leaders. 
Besides the concern for speakers as participants in public discussion and debate, 
Justice Brennan’s opinion reflected concern for receivers of speech.  How would 
they handle a flow of discourse that included erroneous information?  To answer 
this, Justice Brennan recognized that the flow of speech would include the words of 
competing voices:  speech on important matters would not likely go unchallenged.  
He quoted Judge Learned Hand for the point that the First Amendment 
“presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be fathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection,”310 and 
Justice Brandeis for the point that “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good 
ones.”311  In effect, false speech entering public discourse would likely provoke 
counter-speech. 
A third point made by Justice Brennan was his conclusion that false speech had 
a not altogether undesirable function of its own.  Quoting Mill’s On Liberty, Justice 
Brennan wrote that “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable 
contribution to public debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”312  Combining 
this argument with the others—that falsity was inevitable in public debate, that its 
protection (within limits) would help prevent self-censorship and promote truth 
overall, and that counter-speech could be relied upon to challenge at least some 
inaccuracies and misrepresentations—the Court implicitly aligned itself with Dr. 
King’s near-contemporaneous Letter from a Birmingham Jail.313  That letter’s 
message was clear:  truth-telling about the denial of black citizens’ civil rights 
could no longer be deferred, and the reality of conditions must be laid bare to 
prompt discussion, resolve, and reform. 
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Some observers insist that the Court’s efforts in the libel context were wrong-
headed, such as Justice White, who lamented that the Court’s libel jurisprudence 
had disserved the interest in truth.  Concurring in a 1985 case, Justice White wrote, 
“The stream of information about public officials and public affairs is polluted and 
often remains polluted by false information.”314  This viewpoint focused on 
perceived short-term negative effects of the balance struck in Sullivan and its 
progeny, whereas Justice Brennan’s approach focused on a more distant horizon, 
seeing long-term positive effects of expansive freedoms, with significant protection 
for false speech contributing to an overall increase in the flow of truth. 
This difference of emphasis—between concern for immediate “pollution” and 
belief in long-term flow of truth—can be seen in disputes arising from statutes that 
criminalize falsity in various contexts.  United States v. Alvarez examined the 
constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized knowingly false 
statements about the receipt of military honors.315  The targeted speech was not 
comparable to the “inevitable” falsities of public discourse, but consisted of 
specific falsities about specific subject-matter that was non-political in nature.  
And, recognizing that Sullivan drew the line at calculated lies and reckless 
disregard, Congress targeted precisely that level of culpability in the Stolen Valor 
Act.316  The government accordingly defended the Act as addressing non-core 
speech in sensitively narrow fashion. But, in a 6–3 decision, the Court protected 
Alvarez’s false statement that he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor.  
Again, the Justices’ ironic goal was advancing truth by protecting falsity, this time 
a lie. 
Writing for the four-Justice plurality, Justice Kennedy noted that false speech—
when not associated with a legally cognizable harm like reputational injury or 
fraud—had never been considered outside the protection of the First Amendment, 
and that the Stolen Valor Act was best characterized as content regulation 
triggering strict scrutiny.317  In applying that standard of review, Justice Kennedy 
took the long view, making three essential points, each of them echoing Justice 
Brennan’s analysis in Sullivan.  First, the Act’s scope was “sweeping” and 
“unprecedented”:  it applied to false statements made in both public and private 
settings, and it applied “entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the 
purpose of material gain.”318  Upholding an act with such expansive reach, wrote 
Justice Kennedy, would have serious implications for future speech:  it “would 
endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false 
statements are punishable.”319  Identifying a “clear limiting principle” would be 
impossible, he continued, and would contradict “our constitutional tradition,” 
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which “stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”320  
Justice Kennedy could foresee “an endless list of subjects” that government could 
“single out” for official adjudications of truth or falsity, thus consolidating “a broad 
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional 
tradition.”321  Justice Kennedy concluded that “the mere potential for the exercise 
of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free 
speech, thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”322 
Thus, akin to Justice Brennan’s recognition in Sullivan of the potentially 
widespread use of the libel tort against inevitable falsity in public discourse, Justice 
Kennedy’s first step in Alvarez was to recognize the potential multiplication of 
statutes empowering large numbers of official truth adjudications.  And then, like 
Justice Brennan’s consideration of the chilling effect of libel actions, Justice 
Kennedy saw the proliferation of official truth-declaring tribunals as creating a 
destructive chill.  Kennedy’s third point, again like Justice Brennan’s, was that the 
less restrictive solution of counter-speech rendered the Act unnecessary.323  Citing 
the input of citizens and public agencies in Alvarez’s own situation, and the 
possibility of a web-based directory of actual recipients of military honors, Justice 
Kennedy stressed that “the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of 
refutation, can overcome the lie.”324 
The plurality opinion in Alvarez has informed judicial review of state laws 
criminalizing false statements in political contexts.  In 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 
a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down provisions 
of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act.325  The statute targeted knowingly 
false statements about ballot questions when the statements appeared in paid 
political advertisements or campaign material.326  The statute authorized any person 
to bring charges of falsity against another to a state administrative office, thereby 
triggering a probable cause determination by administrative judges, and potentially 
leading to a criminal investigation and state prosecution.327  Echoing themes from 
the cases already discussed, the court found that the statute was prone to political 
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manipulation, that the ease with which a speaker could be subjected to state 
proceedings created an undeniable chilling effect, and that the “tried and true buffer 
and elixir” for honest elections was counter-speech.328  As the court explained, 
“[t]he citizenry, not the government, should be the monitor of falseness in the 
political arena.”329  Emphasizing this capacity of citizens to sift through election 
speech and differentiate truth from falsity, the court relied on Justice Stevens’s 
comment in a case invalidating state regulation of anonymous speech:  “[p]eople 
are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. . . .  They 
can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are permitted, as 
they must be, to read that message.  And then, once they have done so, it is for 
them to decide what is responsible, what is valuable, and what is truth.”330 
Of the many questions raised by these cases, one is whether the law of the First 
Amendment convincingly can be said to place a value on truth-seeking when it 
allows for a potentially great quantity of falsity.  With its focus on the “long haul,” 
is the law putting too much faith in what some surely call a “laissez faire” 
approach?  Can citizens who justly see themselves as living in the “short term” 
tolerate this degree of falsity and still accept the vocabulary of truth-seeking?  Does 
the law place too much faith in the willingness of citizens to sift and weigh, 
particularly when wealth disparities affect the capacity to sift and weigh in the first 
place?  Is there too much faith in counter-speech, too much trust that competing 
voices will speak up or that refutation will be attempted?  Is the law merely 
pretending to promote anything other than informational anarchy? 
In a provocative essay, Eva Brann examines the connection between truth and 
falsity, asking whether “truth is everything and not enough,” and whether falsity is 
in some sense “necessary to the true.”331  Perhaps Brann is merely echoing Mill, 
who famously argued that falsity can bring about a clearer perception, a livelier 
impression, of truth.  Or perhaps Brann’s point is different:  that falsity in some 
instances can bring a clearer perception, not simply of truth, but of ourselves as we 
relate to others and society.  Situating truth-seeking in the everyday lives of 
citizens, Brann explains her point by considering a conundrum.  On the one hand, 
“the intellect is charged with getting things as straight as possible” and “wants not 
only clarity but all the ultimacy it can get to.”332  On the other hand, “for life to be 
livable,” humans often must “curtail thinking” and live “superficially,” not seeking 
resolution of the truth-status of every question but willing to “live with 
compromises destructive of communal ultimates.”333  She concludes that humans 
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often live with a split consciousness, an “inner fracture of being,” and that, 
confronting ideas or attitudes that appear false in some crucial respect, they often 
have to school themselves in the art of coexistence, discovering their own 
capacities for dueling virtues of tolerance and critique.334  Perhaps Brann’s point is 
that truth-seeking for the individual includes encounters with falsity in various 
forms, requiring not only refinement of consciousness but developments of powers 
of empathy and judgment about when falsity should matter and when it need not.  
These encounters can lead to a complex range of self-questioning.  Brann’s insight 
that “truth is everything and not enough” in this way suggests that breathing space 
for falsity, even for lies in some contexts, can serve some larger positive function. 
Ian McEwan’s novel, Atonement, delves more deeply into the question of the 
complex connection between truth and falsity.335  This is a work of fiction that 
probes the allures and dangers of fiction seen as a form of truth-seeking.  
Atonement examines in particular how fiction’s promise—that at least some sense 
can be made of reality by the ordering effects of narrative—can fall prey to 
destructive falsification.  McEwan suggests at the same time that another kind of 
falsification, one inspired by empathy and a sense of quest for the reality of another 
person, can actually embody a form of truth, but a truth that is “everything and not 
enough.”  The levels of consciousness unveiled by this novel suggest that truth-
seeking indeed can and perhaps must exist side-by-side with a clear-eyed 
awareness of all that can be rightly labeled false. 
The novel comprises three sections and a coda.  Section One, the longest, is set 
at the English country house of the Tallis family in the summer of 1935.  Family 
members and guests assemble for a house party, and thirteen-year-old Briony 
Tallis, brimming with literary imagination and the kind of personality she will later 
recall as “busy, priggish, [and] conceited,”336 has written a melodrama for the 
occasion.  Her sister Cecilia is home from Cambridge; her much older brother 
arrives from London with a friend; cousins whose parents are bitterly divorcing are 
present; and Robbie Turner, the son of the Tallises’s cleaning lady and the object of 
Briony’s pre-adolescent crush, is invited to dinner.  Robbie, who is also a student at 
Cambridge, has ambitions to be a doctor and to transcend the class barriers that 
stand between him and Cecilia.  The scene is mostly conveyed through the eyes of 
Briony, whose “overanxious” imagination fuels a series of lurid misinterpretations 
of almost everything that takes place around her.337  In fact, the novel’s opening 
pages recount so many misperceptions that “truth seeking” appears impossible for 
all concerned, particularly (but not only) for Briony.  From a window, she sees and 
is confused by an afternoon encounter between Robbie and Cecilia.  Later, she sees 
them in some kind of physical embrace that she again misunderstands.  The clutter 
of contradictory emotions becomes overwhelming and prompts a need to impose 
imaginative order.  But she disastrously stumbles upon an assault on her female 
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cousin on the grounds of the estate, erroneously concludes that Robbie was the 
attacker, and names him to the police.338  Years later, she grasps the horror of what 
she has done; its impact defines her life.  Robbie’s prison sentence ends with his 
enlistment in the army, in which he is caught up in the chaos at Dunkirk.339 
Section One recounts the house party, the early joys and confusions of love 
between Robbie and Cecilia, Briony’s accusation, and the arrest.  Section Two 
focuses on Robbie’s wartime experience, including Dunkirk.  Section Three 
recounts Robbie’s return to Cecilia and Briony’s eventual apology to the two 
lovers.  They do not forgive her, but there is an implication that at least some of the 
wrong can be righted.  In the coda, the reader learns that the three Sections 
comprise a novel that Briony has spent fifty-nine years composing and has now 
completed as an elderly woman.  It is revealed that, in actuality, Robbie did not 
survive Dunkirk, that Cecelia died in a subway explosion several months after 
Robbie’s death, and that Briony’s apology never was conveyed.340  The adult 
Briony’s goal has been to describe the “pitiless” truth of these events in her book—
“to disguise nothing—the names, the places, the exact circumstances.”341  Thus, 
she recounts the identity of the person she had concluded was the actual rapist (her 
brother’s guest at the house party, who later in life becomes a rich public figure and 
marries the girl he had raped).  And, in all the drafts, written between the mid-
1940s and 1999, Briony has included the actual fates of Robbie and Cecilia—that 
they “never met again, never fulfilled their love.”342  But in the final draft, Briony, 
now seventy-seven years old, nearing her own death and not wishing her novel to 
consist of “the bleakest realism,” changes key facts:  the lovers survive, the apology 
is tendered, and the story ends on a note of hope amidst the fierce waste of war.343 
The “falsity” of Briony’s book, however, is entangled with truth.  Section One is 
an imaginative delving into the inner lives of Cecilia and Robbie, their dreams, 
missteps, and love.  Section Two similarly is a forceful attempt to convey 
Dunkirk—no simple narcissist could have captured it with comparable precision 
and agony.  And Section Three, in effect, tells the story of what Briony took from 
Robbie and Cecilia.  Briony had set in motion a chain of events that led to prison, 
separation, war, and death.  By allowing the lovers in Section Three to elude this 
fate, Briony has tried to atone in the sense of acknowledging—at least to herself—
the deep consequences of the lie.344  Depicting the lovers as alive and together is, in 
that sense, an acknowledgment and confession of what she had denied them.  For 
Briony, this indirect statement of truth is an achievement over her early and never 
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quite vanquished self-centeredness.  The reader can well understand how it took her 
fifty-nine years to write a book that so deeply searches out the hopes, dreams, and 
despair of Robbie and Cecilia.  It may not be an exaggeration to conclude that 
Briony’s lifelong reparation has been a process of getting beyond her oppressively 
dominating ego and arriving at an understanding of the reality and complexity of 
others.  Her falsification allows this type of truth-telling to occur.345 
Of course, Briony’s change of the facts in Section Three can also be seen as a 
grimly self-serving alteration of reality.  The lovers did not survive, and she failed 
to set things right.  Any revision of the facts is nothing less than a 
misrepresentation in a work in which the other details (like the name of the rapist) 
are authentic.  She may have set forth a life that was taken from the lovers, but she 
omitted the facts that it was taken and that she took it.  An obvious question, then, 
is whether the “truth” of her falsified account, as admirable as it was for all the 
above reasons, was actually an unacceptable evasion of responsibility, a sign that 
Briony Tallis never  grew beyond the myopia of her youth.  By taking over the 
narrative in the coda, after ceding the telling to Briony for the three Sections, 
McEwan offers a judgment:  that Briony’s truth is at best partial, and that his own 
rendering in the final pages presents the only authentic account.  Those pages 
capture shockingly the manipulability of truth.  And in the closing lines, McEwan 
suggests that Briony grasps that very point:  she sees that she could manipulate 
more, deviate even further from reality and probably find a way to justify doing so.  
“It’s not impossible,” she thinks, then adds:  “But now I must sleep.”346 
These sentences cry out for interpretation, and at least two readings are possible.  
The first is that they reveal a Briony who has remained “busy, priggish, [and] 
conceited,” ever willing to alter reality to fit her own psychic needs, and that she is 
completely prepared to exercise the same power by adding another scene to the 
novel.  This reading, however, seems inconsistent with the Briony whose discipline 
and attention to others has produced the remarkably moving Sections One, Two, 
and Three of Atonement.  Another reading of the two sentences is that they reveal 
Briony’s coming to grips with the falsifying power—that it has long kept her a 
prisoner and has been her undoing—and that she chooses not to exercise it further, 
not to falsify beyond what it produced in Sections One, Two, or Three.  Why make 
that choice?  Again, there are several possible readings.  One is that she makes the 
choice to stop for a moral reason:  she believes that the mix of truth and falsity in 
her novel comes close enough to meeting a moral standard of acknowledgment and 
atonement.  Another reading is that she ceases simply because her energy is spent, 
her consciousness is exhausted, and she is ready to stop the mind’s wheels.  Her 
back-and-forth travel between truth and falsity has led ultimately to nothing more 
profound than exhaustion and acceptance of death’s imminence. 
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At the very least, Atonement is a description of that difficult kind of travel.  It is 
what the mind does:  navigate, with middling success, the limitations of one’s 
history and the successes, and failures of efforts to become reconciled to oneself.  
At the same time, it is what the mind can decide to stop doing.  In Briony’s case, 
having made a valiant effort (though self-serving in part) to discern her own 
character and especially the natures of those around her, she closes the book.  For 
her, as for most, the work is left unfinished, but much has been achieved:  the mind 
can rest. 
Atonement argues that truth and falsity coexist, with no clear organizing 
principles.  In complex ways, each plays a role in defining the self and clearing a 
pathway to others.  The defamation and statutory falsity cases provide much 
breathing space for error—not to celebrate it but to make use of it.  The legal 
doctrine covered in this section seeks to create conditions for future truthful speech 
by accepting a range of false speech.  A landscape of varied expression is the 
projected result, featuring a not necessarily scientific process of sifting and 
weighing, speaking and counterspeaking, receiving and responding.  Fifty-nine 
years of thinking and weighing got Briony Tallis only so far, but the point is the 
effort to see across a divide and recognize interests, passions, and fates besides 
one’s own.  The fact that Briony at the end does not point to a shining discovered 
truth but simply closes her final draft and says, “Now I must sleep,” does not 
necessarily mean that she has failed. 
IV.  TRUTH-SEEKING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
A final question for this Article is:  what interest can overcome the truth-seeking 
value of the First Amendment?  As has been noted, that value, for all its strength 
and subtlety, makes no claim of automatically outweighing other interests or 
claims.  This Article has argued that the truth-seeking value lies behind cautious 
exploration of the past; it fuels resistance to silencing forces in the present; and it 
prompts the creation of legal rules to ensure a steady flow of accurate information 
in the future.  Most of the cases examined so far were victories for speech and press 
and strongly informed by the truth-seeking value, but when is that value overcome?  
When do the realities of a speech dynamic point in favor of limiting speech rather 
than protecting it? 
Perhaps an answer comes from cases involving campaign finance, where state 
and federal laws purporting to police the marketplace of ideas and to further truth-
seeking objectives in the short term come into conflict with the First Amendment’s 
policy of long-term pursuit of truth.  This was the scenario in the highly 
controversial decision in Citizens United v. FEC.347  At issue was Section 203 of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which criminalized certain political 
advocacy on an anticorruption rationale.348  The Act prohibited unions and 
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corporations, including nonprofits, from spending money from their general 
treasuries to air messages labeled “electioneering communications”——broadcast, 
satellite, or cable advertisements amounting to the functional equivalents of express 
advocacy for or against a federal candidate.  The prohibition spanned sixty days 
before a general election and thirty days before a primary election, and targeted 
“independent expenditures”—those not made in coordination or in concert with the 
federal candidate being supported. The statute, of course, permitted such 
communications outside of the time restrictions, and it permitted them within the 
time restrictions if purchased with funds from a “separate segregated fund” (i.e., a 
political action committee).349  Nonetheless, the Court considered the statute a 
content-based ban on independent spending for political speech, applied strict 
scrutiny, and ruled, 5-4, that the Act violated the First Amendment. 
The Justices in the majority emphasized the problem of disfavoring speech 
based on a speaker’s identity.  As the majority saw it, identity could be a proxy for 
content:  “[S]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker,” wrote Justice 
Kennedy, “are all too often simply a means to control content.”350  Here, the law 
sought “to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, from 
presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”351  Voters thus had less ability “to 
obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their 
votes.”352  On this view, the Act was starkly at odds with the constitutional truth-
seeking value, interfering with the citizen’s ability to receive, evaluate, and 
challenge or support a wide range of political information.353 
On the other hand, the Act’s sponsors, Senators McCain and Feingold, had 
clearly understood campaign finance reform as aiding the citizen to do those very 
things.354  And at least for a time, the government defended the Act in reliance on 
an antidistortion interest, citing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and 
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political ideas.”355  The antidistortion interest could be seen as a statutory truth-
seeking value:  reducing the potential dominance of corporate speech in the final 
months of election season, the drafters believed, could only serve the civic interest 
in accuracy and clarity of whatever social facts had become important in that 
cycle’s public discourse.356  Just as Congress in passing the Stolen Valor Act had 
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been dissatisfied with the First Amendment’s truth-seeking value—with its long 
view and tolerance of falsity—Congress in enacting BCRA had its own vision of 
conditions necessary for the search for—and debate about—true facts in the 
electoral context.  But the majority in Citizens United could find no limiting 
principle in the antidistortion rationale. Those Justices interpreted BCRA’s media 
exemption as an “admission” of the rationale’s invalidity, noted that corporations 
are not monolithic in size or wealth, and rejected the antidistortion rationale as 
interfering with “the open marketplace of ideas.”357  The majority also noted that 
even the government had abandoned the antidistortion rationale, opting instead to 
rely on anticorruption as the governmental interest.358 
Thus, despite the clear populist appeal and intuitive force of the antidistortion 
rationale—with its message that well financed corporate speech can drown out 
other voices and thus impede the voters’ process of evaluating both fact and 
opinion—its rejection was decisive.  Part of the problem may have been doubt 
about its actual meaning.  As Professor Hasen has noted, “It is not clear whether the 
‘drowning out’ idea is more about the wealthy buying up all the advertising space 
on limited media such as television, than it is about large spenders so inundating 
viewers with a message that viewers are persuaded to vote in a particular way, even 
if there is contrary advertising from others.”359  Even Justice Stevens’s dissent 
failed to clarify:  although he accepted the “drowning out” basis of the rationale, he 
disclaimed any underlying goal of fostering political equality.360  In Professor 
Hasen’s view, Justice Stevens’s dissent “offered a hodge-podge of inconsistent 
understandings” of the rationale.361  And even if some version of an antidistortion 
rationale had appealed to a majority, BCRA’s choice of means—a speech ban—
was foreign to methods associated with the First Amendment’s truth-seeking value.  
The majority’s view was that the ban departed from the strategy of encouraging 
“more speech” and failed to “entrust the people to judge what is true and what is 
false.”362  This analysis tracked a deep strain of traditional First Amendment 
thought—that counterspeech is the presumptive methodology of a “free trade in 
ideas,” premised on trust in the citizen’s ability to evaluate and act upon 
information. Perhaps BCRA and the majority shared an overriding vision of a 
search for functional political truth, but the statute’s mistake was to orchestrate the 
search in top-down fashion. Moving then from anti-distortion to anticorruption, the 
majority had little trouble declaring that independent expenditures—those without 
“prearrangement and coordination”—could not be corrupting.  At every juncture, 
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the decision strived for consistency with the truth-seeking value, at least in theory. 
But, as this Article has argued, the truth-seeking value of the First Amendment 
is concerned more with facts than with theory—more with actual dynamics than 
with mental constructs.  Sullivan had focused on the practical realities of the 
common law libel tort and the incentives it created, including its chilling effect.363  
More recently, the appellate court in 281 Care Comm. emphasized the workings of 
“false statement” laws, relying on a description by state attorneys general that 
showed the fraud inducing impact of such laws on the political process.364  In 
Citizens United itself, Justice Kennedy, urging awareness of “the real operations of 
this legislation” cautioned that “rhetoric ought not obscure reality.”365 
The majority’s opinion, however, rested on a premise that was arguably at odds 
with reality then and seems even more so now.  That premise was that the corporate 
expenditures at issue would be “independent,” in the sense of uncoordinated with a 
specific candidate or campaign.  On this understanding, the majority ruled that 
“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption,” that “ingratiation and access are not 
corruption,” and consequently that BCRA’s ban was unjustified by any compelling 
governmental interest.366 
The problem is that well documented developments show that troubling varieties 
of coordination clearly do exist, especially with the rise of Super PACs, and that 
“expenditures meeting the legal definition of ‘independent expenditure’ are not 
truly ‘independent’ in any meaningful sense of the word.”367  Would the Citizens 
United majority write today with the same conviction if they were confronted with 
the reality that “independent-expenditure-only political committees” can be run by 
individuals with extremely close relationships to the candidate in question?368  Or if 
they were confronted with the law’s acquiescence to a broad range of collaborative 
fundraising activities?369 
If a Super PAC’s unrestricted “independent expenditures” are actually illegal 
contributions to candidates, as they widely appear to be, then the credibility of the 
system approved by the Court is highly doubtful.  The truth-seeking value of the 
First Amendment, never meant to be absolute and always meant to be reliant on 
more than presumptions about how the world operates, can offer little protection 
for such a system.  The falsity of “independence” fosters cynicism and 
estrangement; it echoes the duplicity Scott attributed to the Raj, the half-truths of 
Ishiguro’s Hailsham, and the fraught corridors of the Tallis household, where a 
central untruth undermines all sustaining relationships.   
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CONCLUSION 
First Amendment cases do not always invoke the truth-seeking value, but it 
profoundly affects the vocabulary and direction of many decisions.  As Bernard 
Williams teaches, most of the time the assertions of speakers aim, or purport to 
aim, at accuracy.  With the First Amendment, speech enjoys a generous range of 
freedom because such breadth enhances the chances that accurate (or at least 
provisionally accurate) understandings will emerge in the aggregate of public 
discourse. 
As an idea of the First Amendment, the truth-seeking value displays different 
concerns in different contexts.  In some cases, it explores how much of the 
seemingly unknowable past can be salvaged to assist in current struggles to 
understand society and politics.  In other cases, it demands information about 
today’s facts, too many of which are locked away by agents of public or private 
power.  In yet other cases, it fashions rules for a future flow of information, 
condoning a complex braiding of truth and falsity, because human experience 
teaches that there can be roles for both. 
As the works of Williams, Murdoch, Scott, Ishiguro, and McEwan reveal, the 
meanings and effects of truth-seeking are still of vital interest to contemporary 
thought.  In that quintessential American play, Our Town, even the dead argue 
about what might qualify as true.370  The third and final Act is set in a hillside 
cemetery, where the dead converse while vaguely awaiting a further 
transformation.  One of them, Simon Stimson, who in life had been an alcoholic 
choir director, remains a figure of bitterness even in the grave.  To young Emily, a 
recent addition to the ranks of the dead who has had the chance to go back among 
the living only to find the missed connections between humans too painful, Simon 
inveighs against life, insisting that it was all misery and cruelty.  As Simon puts it:  
Yes, now you know!  Now you know!  That’s what it was to walk about in a cloud of 
ignorance, to go up and down trampling on the feelings of those about you, to spend 
and waste time as though you had a million years, to be always at the mercy of one 
self-centered passion, or another.  Now you know—that’s the happy existence you 
wanted to go back to.  Ignorance and blindness.371 
But another voice answers Simon and sharply differs.  This is Mrs. Gibbs, who 
in life had praised the seeking of experience and all that might be learned from 
venturing beyond safe precincts, declaring, “It seems to me that once in your life 
before you die you ought to see a country where they don’t talk in English and 
don’t even want to.”372  Now dead, hearing Simon’s rant about “ignorance and 
blindness,” Mrs. Gibbs answers, “Simon Stimson, that ain’t the whole truth and 
you know it.”373  She may think he is leaving out the shared nature of the search for 
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experience and a deliberate kind of growth.  Soon the stillness of the place and hour 
takes over.  The world of Act Three is hardly a rambunctious market of ideas, but 
the exchanges there do reflect the truth-seeking quality of living American talk—its 
ubiquity, its sometimes harsh insistences on what is or is not, its spectrum of 
responses, its memories, its silences. 
 
